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Opt-In Stewardship:
Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority
Sean J. Griffith*
98 TEXAS LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020)
Abstract
This article offers a theory of mutual fund voting to answer when mutual funds should
vote on behalf of their investors and when they should not. It argues that voting authority
for mutual funds ought to depend upon: (1) whether the fund possesses a comparative
information advantage, and (2) the ability of the fund to assume a common investor
purpose. The strongest case for mutual fund voting is one in which high-quality
information is produced and the fund is able to assume a common investor purpose. The
case for mutual fund voting is weaker when low quality information is produced or where
funds cannot assume a common investor purpose.
Applying this theory answers whether and how mutual funds should vote on recurring
issues. Mutual funds ought to vote on "contests"—that is, proxy fights and M&A—
because meaningful information is produced and because the fund can assume a common
interest on the part of its investors. By the same token, funds ought not to exercise voting
discretion over environmental, social and governance issues.
With respect to
environmental and social issues, meaningful information is not produced nor can mutual
funds assume a common investor purpose. With respect to governance issues, although
funds can assume a unified investor purpose, they do not have adequate information to
decide the matter. As a result, mutual funds should follow the voting recommendations of
unconflicted managers, as will typically be the case with regard to environmental and
social proposals. However, when management is conflicted, as will often be the case
with regard to governance proposals, funds should abstain from voting altogether.
This analysis provides a clear rubric for ensuring that mutual fund voting serves investor
interests. However, the possibility remains that mutual funds may use voting to pursue
their own interests rather than those of their investors. Regulators should therefore act
to reset the default allocations of voting authority between mutual funds and their
investors.
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I.

Introduction

Mutual funds are now the center of power in corporate governance. After decades
of strong growth, mutual funds now own about one third of the total U.S. stock market. 1
The “Big Three” mutual fund families—Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street—are the
largest shareholders in the vast majority of large publicly traded companies.2 Vanguard
alone owns blocks of 5% or more in 468 of the companies in the S&P 500. 3 And they
vote. Although they do not receive the economic benefit of the shares they hold—their
investors do—mutual funds are empowered to vote them. 4 This aggregated voting power
makes mutual funds the ultimate arbiters of corporate governance. Accordingly, hedge
fund activists stake their campaigns on winning mutual fund support. 5 And policy
entrepreneurs lobby mutual funds to favor their causes. 6
Mutual funds’ voting power has recently been seen as cause for alarm. Some
argue that broad ownership of public companies by index funds will dampen corporate
incentives to perform.7 Others worry over the accumulation of too much power in too

1

Mutual Funds, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/255547/percentage-of-total-marketsecurities-held-by-investment-companies/ (providing data showing U.S. mutual funds held 24% of all U.S.
corporate equities in 2017).
2
See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 319–20 (2017) (finding that the Big
Three own the largest stakes in 40% of all U.S. listed companies, and in 90% of the S&P 500).
3
See Sarah Krouse et al., Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive Investors, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101.
4
See infra.
5
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and
the Revaluation of Governance 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); see also Justin Baer & Dawn Lim, Mutual
Fund Managers Try a New Role:
Activist Investor, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mutual-fund-managers-try-a-new-role-activist-investor-11546174800; David
Benoit & Kristen Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-secret-ally-big-mutual-funds-1439173910.
6
For example, a proposal by the Sisters of the Holy Names and Jesus and Mary to force the manufacturer
of Smith & Wesson firearms to report on its efforts to control gun violence succeeded with the support of
Blackrock. See David Meyer, Nuns vs. Guns: How These Sisters Took on Smith & Wesson—And Won,
FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/09/26/nuns-gun-violence-report-proposal-smithwesson/. Likewise, environmental groups regularly enlist the support of Blackrock, State Street, and
Vanguard to press energy companies to report on climate change. See, e.g., Eric Rosenbaum, Exxon Mobil
Loses Support of a Powerful Voice in Climate Change Policy, CNBC ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/31/investing-power-vanguard-votes-against-exxon-mobil-on-climatechange.html.
7
See Inigo Fraser-Jenkins et al., The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing is Worse Than
Marxism, BERNSTEIN RESEARCH (Aug. 23, 2016) (arguing that large-scale indexing harms price discovery);
see also Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016); Fiona Scott Morton &
Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026 (2018); Eric A.
Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of
Institutional Investors, ANTITRUST L. J. (forthcoming). But see Edward Rock & Daniel Rubinfeld,
Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 ANTITRUST L. J. 221 (2018) (proposing a safe-harbor to insulate
institutional investors from antitrust concerns); Alessandro Romano, Horizontal Shareholding: The End of
Markets and the Rise of Networks (working paper, Sept. 2018) (disputing the claims of the concentrated
ownership literature by arguing that spillovers across markets prevent the blunting of incentives).
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few hands8 and warn that it may lead to politics by other means. 9 These concerns have
spurred congressional hearings 10 and fueled initiatives for regulatory reform.11
These concerns have also launched a second wave of academic commentary on
institutional ownership.12 The first wave had offered institutional ownership as a solution
to the problem of rational apathy—that is, the information and incentive problems that
make individual investors lax monitors of corporate governance. 13 Institutional investors,
in theory at least, hold large enough blocks to care about monitoring. 14 Unfortunately,
first wave commentators soon found themselves explaining why institutional investors

8

John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Sept. 20, 2018)
(unpublished essay) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337). The founder of the index fund has
raised similar concerns. See John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds-1543504551 (warning
that the Big Three will soon have effective control of the U.S. stock market and stating that “I do not
believe that such concentration would serve the national interest.”).
9
Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, Keep Politics Out of the Boardroom, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/keep-politics-out-of-the-boardroom-1531952912 (“The rise of index funds,
which own an ever-greater portion of U.S. stocks, raises the specter of a vast number of shares being voted
by fund managers and their proxy advisers who don’t own the shares and may have a conflict of interest
with the people who do.”).
10
See, e.g., Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing on the Application of
Environmental, Social, and Governance Principles in Investing and the Role of Asset Managers, Proxy
Advisors, and Other Intermediaries, Apr. 2, 2019.
11
The SEC signaled an interest in reforming the proxy process, first by withdrawing interpretive letters
providing comfort to institutions relying on proxy advisory firms’ voting recommendations, and second by
hosting a roundtable of industry leaders to explore regulatory reform. See SEC, Chairman Jay Clayton,
Statement Announcing SEC Staff Roundtable on the Proxy Process, July 30, 2018 (announcing roundtable
and tentative agenda to be held in November 2018); SEC, Division of Investment Management, Statement
Regarding Staff Proxy Advisory Letters, Sept. 13, 2018 (announcing withdrawal of the interpretive letters).
See also Cydney Posner, What Happened at the SEC’s Proxy Process Roundtable?, at
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/21/what-happened-at-the-secs-proxy-process-roundtable/
(summarizing discussion at the November roundtable).
12
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 89–90 (2017); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the
Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming); Luca
Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Perspective,
ECGI Law Working Paper N° 393/2018 (Apr. 2018); Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Passive Investors, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted
Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, __ BU L Rev __ (forthcoming 2019); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S.
Lund, Toward a Mission Statement for Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation, __ U. CHI. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2020); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders be Shareholders 10 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18-39,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098; Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and
Fiduciary Obligation, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 175 (2017); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive
Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 494 (2018).
13
See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, 390–92 (1986) (describing the low rate of individual
investor participation in shareholder elections as a rational response to their inability to influence corporate
decision-making relative to the costs of becoming informed and voting on that basis). For more detailed
discussion of rational apathy, see infra XX-YY.
14
See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 524 (1990) (noting that
“apathy makes exponentially less sense as shareholdings grow, as long as there is a critical mass of other
large shareholders”).
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nevertheless failed to monitor.15 They chalked it up to collective action problems,16
conflicts of interest,17 regulatory interference,18 and a preference for exit over voice.19
Why, given the thorough treatment of these issues in the prior literature, are academics
now revisiting these questions? Because of two major changes since the first wave: the
rise of the index and the rise of stewardship.
The rise of the index represents a significant change because institutional
investors were often treated by first wave commentators as active or, at least, selective in
their investment strategies, designing portfolios that sought to overweight good
performers.20 In contrast, indexes, ETFs, and other passive funds simply track the
performance of an index, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 2000, 21 competing on cost
more than return.22 Yet index funds routinely outperform active funds, especially after
fees are taken into account.23 Accordingly, index funds now account for approximately
one-third of the mutual fund market in the U.S. and are on track to surpass active funds in
the very near future.24 This has important implications for monitoring. Most notably, in
15

See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 811 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism
in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 795–853 (1993).
16
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO.
L.J. 445, 453–63 (1991) (emphasizing problems of collective action underlying institutional investor
passivity).
17
Bernard S. Black, Passivity Reexamined, supra note 14, at 595–608 (separating institutional shareholders
into different types and identifying conflicts for each, noting that mutual funds have conflicts arising from
their interest in pursuing corporate 401(k) accounts and in preserving access to “soft” information).
18
Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89, 89–90 (1990); Mark J.
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11 (1991).
19
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1280 n.8, 1281 (1991) (arguing that in the absence of a controlling stake
institutional investors prefer liquidity to control and therefore fail to monitor).
20
See generally Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior
Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2048 (1994) (“Overweighting means that the institution
owns a greater share of the specific company than it owns of the market generally. An overweighted firm
has a greater incentive to intervene, because it will gain more from success than its competitors.”).
21
For brevity, I will refer to ETFs, index funds, and other passive mutual funds that seek to track the
performance of an index as “index funds.”
22
John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and
Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 153 (2007) (“[P]rice competition is in fact a strong force
constraining fund advisers . . . .”). On this point, it is worth noting that Fidelity recently launched no fee
index funds. See Tim McLaughlin & Ross Kerber, Fidelity offer of no-fee index funds hurts shares of
rivals, Reuters, Aug. 1, 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fidelity-funds-feesidUSKBN1KM5D5 (describing BlackRock’s negative share price reaction to Fidelity’s announcement that
it would offer no-fee index funds).
23
MORNINGSTAR MANAGER RESEARCH, MORNINGSTAR’S ACTIVE/PASSIVE BAROMETER (Aug. 2018)
(finding that only “36% of active managers … both survived and outperformed their average passive peer
over the 12 [prior] months through June 2018. In 2017, 43% of active managers achieved this feat”).
24
Trevor Hunnicutt, Index funds to surpass active fund assets in U.S. by 2024: Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb 2,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-sby-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN (quoting a Moody’s report explaining the reason for the shift as
“investors’ growing awareness that, by definition, actively managed investments, in aggregate, cannot
deliver above average performance, and that investing is therefore a zero-sum game - for every winner,
there must be a loser”).

5

light of the fact that they are not trying to pick winners,25 index fund managers might be
largely indifferent to the performance of individual portfolio companies and therefore
unlikely to invest in monitoring.26 Alternatively, insofar as index funds are concerned
about the performance of the portfolio as a whole, they might pressure individual
companies to forego profit opportunities that come at the expense of other companies in
the portfolio.27 The index fund thus presents a new kind of institutional intermediary
with different incentives in monitoring.
The second major change underlying renewed interest in institutional investors is
the rise of stewardship—that is, the willingness of funds to engage with portfolio
companies, principally through voting.28 Each of the Big Three touts its commitment to
proxy voting as an essential component of its mission.29 And the data show that mutual
funds do indeed vote their proxies.30 Whether active voting translates into meaningful
monitoring is a topic debated by new wave commentators. The enormity of the task
provides ample grounds for skepticism.31 In the 2018 proxy season, for example,
Vanguard voted on over 168,000 proposals at over 19,000 meetings for more than 12,000
companies.32 Moreover, the data show that mutual funds cast their votes overwhelmingly

25

But see Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing
(working paper) (arguing that index construction involves substantial discretion and that therefore index
investing is best understood as investment management by the index creator rather than a fund manager).
26
See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 12, at 4; Lund, supra note 12, at 495. But see Kahan & Rock, supra
note 12, at 21 (arguing that, at least for the Big 3, their ownership stake is sufficiently large for them to care
about individual performance).
27
Such anti-competitive concerns are the focus of the recent debate in the antitrust literature. See supra
note 7.
28
Engagement comes in many forms—phone calls, public letters, and private meetings—but each depends
ultimately upon the institution’s voting power.
29
See Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (noting that “our
responsibility to engage and vote is now more important than ever”); Asset Stewardship, State Street Global
Advisors, https://www.ssga.com/about-us/asset-stewardship.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (“Our
approach to stewardship is designed to have an impact through thought leadership, engagement, proxy
voting and client disclosure.”); VANGUARD GROUP, 2018 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 3
(2018) [hereinafter VANGUARD REPORT] (emphasizing “four pillars” of engagement: board composition,
executive compensation, oversight of risk and strategy, and governance structures).
30
See
BROADRIDGE,
REPORT:
2018
PROXY
SEASON
REVIEW
(2018),
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/gated/broadridge-2018-proxy-season-review.pdf
(reporting
institutional investor participation at 91%, compared to 28% for ordinary “retail” investors). For discussion
of the reasons why mutual funds are now actively voting, see infra Part II.B.
31
See Lund, supra note 12, at 516 (“Vanguard employs fifteen people devoted to engagement and voting at
about 13,000 companies based around the world, BlackRock employs about twenty people who work on
governance issues at some 14,000 companies, and State Street employs fewer than ten people devoted to
governance issues at around 9,000 companies.”).
32
VANGUARD REPORT, supra note 29, at 9. Over roughly the same period, Blackrock and State Street each
voted at over 17,000 meetings on over 158,000 proposals. BlackRock, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP
REPORT: 2018 VOTING AND ENGAGEMENT REPORT, July 1, 2017– June 30, 2018 (Aug. 31, 2018); State
Street Global Advisors, STEWARDSHIP, Year-End 2017.
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in favor of management.33 In order to be effective monitors, some argue, mutual funds
must invest more in stewardship.34
But how much? What is the right amount of resources for mutual funds to invest
in stewardship?
How often should they vote contrary to management’s
recommendations? And when should mutual funds choose simply not to vote at all?
What is the limiting principle of mutual fund stewardship, for index funds in particular?
How much should we really expect of stewardship programs, and with regard to what
issues should we expect more or less? These questions have gone unasked and
unanswered in the current debate. Yet they are central questions in understanding what
stewardship programs can and cannot deliver.
This article aims to answer those questions by grounding them in a theory of
delegated voting. Unlike the citizens of a democracy, shareholders do not vote to enact
their freedoms or to fulfill their civic duty. They vote to inform corporate managers of
their preferences and to constrain managerial agency costs.35 The union of voting rights
with economic returns is fundamental to the operation of this system, yet mutual funds
separate economic returns (which go to the investors) from voting rights (which go to the
fund).36 This introduces an intermediary and, therefore, the potential for conflict. 37 The
question thus becomes one of specifying when and whether a rational investor would
prefer to delegate voting rights to a mutual fund intermediary rather than keeping them
for herself.
The decision to delegate voting rights depends upon information and purpose. A
rational investor will delegate voting rights to an intermediary if and only if the
intermediary possesses a comparative advantage in acquiring or analyzing the
information necessary to vote intelligently. This comparative advantage in information is
the basis for scholars’ belief that institutional investors can solve the rational apathy
problem. The second essential consideration, often neglected, is purpose. A rational
investor will delegate voting rights to an intermediary if and only if the intermediary
shares the investors’ purpose. Both elements are necessary. If the intermediary’s purpose
is somehow opposed to the investor’s, the delegation of voting rights does not make
sense even if the intermediary has an information advantage.
The article applies this theory of delegated voting to design a set of default rules
for mutual fund voting covering each of the paradigmatic issues on which shareholders
vote. The principal situation in which mutual funds ought to exercise discretion in voting
on their investors’ behalf is in "contests"—that is, proxy fights and M&A. In contests,
meaningful information is produced, and the mutual fund has a comparative advantage
over most ordinary investors in analyzing this information. As importantly, in contests,
the mutual fund intermediary can assume a common interest on the part of its investors.
The opposite situation is presented by environmental and social proposals. There mutual
33

See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds (Apr. 16, 2018)
(unpublished paper) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124039). For more detailed discussion of
mutual fund voting patterns, see infra XX-YY.
34
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 12, at XX.
35
See infra.
36
See infra.
37
Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 573 (2015).
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funds are not presented with meaningful information nor are they able to assume a
common purpose on the part of their investors. Fortunately, unlike contests, there is no
reason to suppose that management is conflicted in assessing environmental and social
proposals. Mutual funds should therefore defer to management’s recommendation when
voting on issues. However, investors with differing objectives should be given an
opportunity to opt out, either ex ante (through special funds) or ex post (through a form of
pass-through voting).
Governance issues are distinguishable from both contests and from environmental
and social proposals. Like contests (and unlike environmental and social issues), mutual
funds can assume a common investor purpose with respect to governance. Investors will
favor governance reforms that increase corporate value and oppose governance changes
that decrease it. Also like contests (and unlike environmental and social issues), a
manager’s recommendation with respect to governance reforms may be tainted by her
own interests. Managers can be expected to disfavor governance reforms that restrict
their authority or reduce their tenure. However, considering the unproven link between
governance and performance, mutual funds do not have a comparative informational
advantage in voting intelligently on governance. Therefore, in the absence of meaningful
information concerning the effect of a given governance reform on the performance of a
specific firm, mutual funds should abstain from voting on governance proposals. Instead,
the votes should either be passed-through to investors or not voted at all.
The theory of delegated voting articulated here should serve both to ground
scholarly debate and to guide policy-makers considering revisions to the proxy voting
system. From this introduction, the article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the
structure of mutual fund voting, how it has evolved from its contractual and technological
foundations, and how it has been affected by regulatory interventions. Part III then
reviews theories of corporate voting and adapts these to build a theory of delegated
voting. Next, Part IV applies the theory of delegated voting to articulate an optimal set of
default voting rules for each of the recurring issues on which a mutual fund might be
asked to vote. Part V analyzes how law and regulation must change in order to bring
mutual fund voting practices into better alignment with the preferences of their investors.
The article then closes with a brief summary and conclusion.

II.

The Structure of Mutual Fund Voting

The structure of mutual fund voting is derived from the contractual relationship
between mutual funds and their investors as overlain by law and regulation. The
technology of shareholder voting plays a complicating role. However, the structure of
mutual fund voting has been more responsive to shifts in the regulatory environment than
the evolution of voting technologies. This Part reviews the structure of mutual fund
voting, focusing on its contractual origins, regulatory interventions, and the voting
policies and practices that have resulted from this dynamic.

A. Contractual Foundations

8

Mutual funds pool investor assets to buy a portfolio of debt, equity, or other
investment securities.38 Day-to-day operations of mutual funds are managed by
professional advisors who provide contractual services to funds, including portfolio
selection and management, in exchange for a fee based on the fund’s assets under
management (“AUM”).39 Advisors typically offer a variety of mutual funds within the
same advisory firm or “fund family.”40 An advisory firm’s return is based exclusively on
its contractual fees.41 Fees are assessed as a percentage of AUM,42 and are significantly
higher for actively managed funds than they are for index funds.43 Most fund families
offer both actively managed and index funds,44 and even those that offer more index than
active funds may derive the bulk of their fee revenue from active funds. 45
In contrast to the advisory firms, mutual fund investors’ returns are derived
entirely from the performance of portfolio assets, expressed as Net Asset Value
(“NAV”).46 However, in spite of receiving the full economic return, net of fees, of the
portfolio companies in which the fund invests, mutual fund investors do not receive the
right to vote portfolio company shares. Instead, advisory firms require investors to
38

WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW 19 (Oxford 2016) (“A mutual
fund is a financial tool that gathers money from several different investors and uses the combined pool of
assets to buy a portfolio of stocks, bonds, or other investments.“) See also Investment Company Act of
1940 § 3(a)(1)(A), (C), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A), (C) (defining investment companies, popularly known
as mutual funds, as an issuer that “is . . . engaged primarily . . . in the business of investing, reinvesting, or
trading in securities,” or which “owns . . . investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of
the value of such issuer’s total assets”).
39
See generally BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE 45–50; John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously:
Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 91 (2010).
40
Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty, supra note XX, at 181. For example, BlackRock markets nearly twohundred different funds, including a wide variety of index funds and ETFs as well as actively managed
funds.
All
BlackRock
Funds,
MORNINGSTAR,
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/fundfamily/blackrock/0C000034YC/fund-list.aspx (last visited Jan. 26,
2019).
41
By law mutual fund advisory fees cannot include a performance component. See Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, § 205(b), 15 U.S.C. 80b-5(b); John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A
Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014).
42
In addition to management fees assessed as a percentage of AUM, mutual funds may assess fees on sales
(“loads”), redemptions (“12b-1 fees”), and other administrative expenses. See SEC, Mutual Funds and
ETFS: A Guide for Investors, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf, at 26-28
(categorizing fees).
43
See Timothy Strauts, Morningstar: Five Charts on U.S. Fund Flows, Mar. 12, 2018, at
https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2018/03/12/fund-flows-charts.html (showing active equity funds on
average have fees 50 basis points higher than passive equity funds). Fees are also typically higher for
“socially responsible” funds. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: The Paradox Of
ESG & Passive ESG Funds (working paper).
44
Lund, supra note XX, at YY (noting that each of the Big Three is known predominantly for index funds,
while Fidelity and T. Rowe Price, for example, are known predominantly for its active funds).
45
See Griffith & Lund, supra note XX, at [127] (noting that “BlackRock’s smaller share of active funds
generates an equal amount of revenue as its passive funds—approximately $1.3 billion each quarter”).
46
NAV is the total value of the fund’s assets minus its liabilities divided by the number of mutual fund
shares outstanding. It is calculated at the end of each trading day. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, The
Flawed Mechanics of Mutual Fund Fee Litigation, 32 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 15 (2015) (“Redemption rights
allow [mutual fund] shareholders to turn over their shares directly to their funds and receive in exchange a
cash payout equal to the shares' net asset value or “NAV.” The NAV is simply the portion of a fund's total
net assets that corresponds to each share.”).
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delegate their voting rights as a condition to investing in the fund. Although some large
institutional investors—most notably, large pension funds—are able to negotiate
exceptions to this rule, smaller investors have no choice. As a result, most mutual fund
investors receive the economic returns of portfolio company shares but no right to vote
their proportional interest in them.
The separation of economic returns and voting rights inherent in mutual fund
investing likely reflects the underdeveloped infrastructure of shareholder voting. The
shareholder voting system developed around late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
technologies for tracking share ownership, which originally focused on physical
certification or registration of ownership on the corporation’s stock ledger. 47 Now, due in
part to regulatory encouragement,48 most corporate shares are held in depository accounts
through banks or brokerage firms and beneficial ownership is recorded in corporate
ledgers in “street name” only.49 This arcane system complicates shareholder voting
largely as a result of the number of agents a company or a proxy contestant must work
through in order to find the ultimate beneficial owner entitled to vote. 50 Imposing this
system on mutual funds—requiring funds to track beneficial ownership, distribute proxy
materials to investors, and tabulate their votes—would have entailed enormous
recordkeeping costs, potentially swamping the benefits of low-cost diversification. Faced
with such costs, investors might have opted to diversify on their own, and the mutual
fund industry might never have gotten off the ground. Funds therefore took on voting as
an administrative necessity, to minimize expenses.
Does the delegation of voting rights to mutual funds remain an administrative
necessity? A number of points are worth raising here. First, if mutual funds were to pass
votes through to their investors, there is no reason to suppose they would be forced to do
so in the same way as banks and brokerage firms. Unlike the intermediaries in the
depository holding system, mutual funds are in the legal owners of the shares. Because
mutual funds know what they own, some basic problems of that system—tracking
ownership and tallying votes—are avoided. Moreover, there is no reason to force mutual
funds to communicate with their investors in the same highly regulated way that
corporations communicate with their shareholders. A much lighter simpler process could
be imagined.51 For example, a mutual fund could notify its investors that a proxy
statement has been posted with regard to a particular portfolio company and invite them
to register their preferences via the internet. The burden would then be on the investor to
download and read the proxy statement and upload their preferences. An investor that
47

U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (amended 2003) (describing the paperwork required to track ownership of
corporate shares which had “reached crisis proportions by the late 1960s”).
48
See Exchange Act section 17A(e), 15 USC 78q-1(e), (directing the SEC to end physical movement of
securities certificates in connection with settlement of transactions, thereby effectively compelling the
current system of street name ownership).
49
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1237-38
(2008).
50
Id., at 1248-62 (developing a typology of “pathologies” introduced into shareholder voting by the system
for tracking share ownership).
51
For a more detailed discussion of how pass-through voting might be adapted to the mutual fund context
and issues arising therefrom, see Sean J. Griffith & Abigail J. Marcus, Preference Registration (working
paper).
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did not upload a preference would effectively delegate authority to the mutual fund to
vote or abstain, depending upon the relevant default. Nor does investing in a mutual fund
through agents necessarily complicate the process.52 The mutual fund would satisfy its
burden by notifying its investor of the opportunity to upload a voting preference. If that
investor is an intermediary agent of another investor, the burden of gathering and
uploading investor preferences would fall on the agent. 53 All the mutual fund would have
to do is notify its investors of the opportunity to upload a voting preference, digitally tally
them once the period for doing so had closed, then transmit the ultimate voting result to
the company.
Advances in digital technology might lighten this burden still further. 54 In
particular, some have argued that blockchain technology promises to substantially
improve the system of shareholder voting. 55 Maybe so. But for these purposes, an old
fashioned computer would do. Determining an investor’s proportional voting interest is
not dramatically different from determining NAV, something funds do every day. It is
not higher math. As a result, although pass-through voting has been dismissed as
“expensive and unmanageable,” it need not be so, especially in light of technologies at
our disposal.56
The real question with pass-through voting is thus not whether it can be done, but
whether it should be. Here the problem is not technology. 57 It is rational investor
apathy.58 Individual investors vote their shares less than 30% of the time.59 For mutual
fund investors, voting turnout would likely be far lower. Individual mutual fund
investors can be expected to tire quickly of being asked each year to evaluate and vote on
52

Many investors invest in mutual funds through a broker rather than through the fund family directly.
This is often a mistake. See, e.g., Daniel Bergstresser, John M.R. Chalmers, and Peter Tufano, Assessing
the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4129, 4130 (2009)
(comparing the returns of mutual funds sold by brokers with mutual fund sold directly by fund complexes).
53
In this way the “agents all the way down” problem need not be a problem for the mutual fund. It would
perform by notifying the entity through which the investor had invested with it.
54
See generally John Armour, Luca Enriques, Ariel Ezrachi &John Vella, Putting Technology to Good Use
for Society: The Role of Corporate, Competition and Tax Law (ECGI, Working Paper No. 427, 2018),
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3287696 (reviewing ways in which technological advances can be used to
improve business law); Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why “Blockchain” Will
Disrupt Corporate Organizations: What Can Be Learned From the “Digital Transformation” (ECGI,
Working Paper No. 419,2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933; Mark Fenwick, Joseph A. McCahery &
Erik Vermeulen, The End of “Corporate” Governance (Hello “Platform” Governance), ECGI Law working
paper 430/2018 (Jan. 2019).
55
George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 227 (2018). David
Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, REV. FIN. (forthcoming), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2700475.
56
Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for
Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 889 (2009).
57
See generally Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants,
MD. L. REV. (forthcoming), at 33-35 (hypothesizing technological protocols for pass-through voting).
58
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 6 , at n.132 (rejecting pass-through voting as “likely to fail because of the
original Berle-Means problem: the passivity of dispersed owners”); Taub, supra note 56, at 889
(concluding that pass-through voting would be “ineffective” due to investors’ failure to vote).
59
BROADRIDGE, REPORT, supra note 30 (reporting retail investor turnout at less than 30% each year
between 2014–2018).
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thousands of matters over which their miniscule voting stakes likely make no difference
at all. This fractionalization of voting power combined with the information overload
inherent in being asked to weigh in on so many matters suggests that pass-through voting
threatens to vastly increase the problem of rational apathy and lead to less voting.
Rational apathy is an information problem with up to three distinct components.
First, ordinary investors may not possess the information they need to vote intelligently.
Second, ordinary investors may not possess the financial sophistication necessary to
understand available information. And third, ordinary investors may not have an
incentive to devote the time and attention necessary to understand available information.
The second and third components are related: an ordinary investor that devoted a
sufficient amount of time and attention could acquire financial sophistication as well, but
non-professionals may lack the incentive to do so. Institutional intermediation promises
to address all three problems. Institutions know what information to ask for. They know
what it means. And they hold sufficiently large stakes to care.
Still, at the level of theory, separating economic returns from voting rights sets off
alarm bells. Scholars uncovering instances in which hedge funds decoupled economic
and voting rights through financial engineering famously labelled the practice “empty
voting.”60 Yet mutual funds decouple economic and voting rights every day. Scholarly
acquiescence to this arrangement depends upon the fund managers proving better
monitors of the corporation than the investors themselves. This may not always be the
case.61
Rational apathy likely explains why investors are so willing to hand over voting
rights as part of investing in a mutual fund. If investors do not care to vote, they are not
likely to protest to signing their voting rights over to the fund. Still, rational apathy does
not explain why mutual funds vote so often—over 90% of the time. Indeed, it seems that
a rationally apathetic investor would be just as happy for mutual funds not to vote their
shares. If their investors care so little, why do mutual funds care so much? The answer,
the next section argues, has to do with the regulation of mutual funds.

B. Regulatory Interventions
Mutual funds have a centuries-long history in Europe.62 In the United States, they
arose in the mid-1920s, just in time to attract investors for the stock-market crash of

60

Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 812 (2006) (coining the phrase and providing examples of situations in
which empty voting produce outcomes that reduce the company’s share price).
61
See infra.
62
The beginnings trace to the 1770s in Holland, when a Dutch merchant created an early version of the
closed-end mutual fund which he sold to the public under the name of “Eendragt Maakt Magt” or “unity
creates strength.” See The History of Mutual Funds, IFIC, https://www.ific.ca/en/articles/who-we-arehistory-of-mutual-funds/.
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1929.63 The response to that crash led to federal regulation of the securities industry,
with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, 64 and also of the mutual
fund industry, with the Investment Company Act (the “ICA”) and the Investment Advisor
Act (the “IAA”), both passed in 1940. 65 The ICA provides rules governing the
organization and structure of mutual funds. 66 The IAA provides rules governing the
individuals and firms providing advisory and management services to funds and
investors.67 Both are administered by the SEC.68
In spite of their long history, the growth of mutual funds did not begin in earnest
until the 1970s. The catalyst was passage of the Employee Retirement Income and
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).69 ERISA created incentives for employers to move
employee retirement savings from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. 70
For employees, the upside was portability and greater choice of investments. 71 For the
fund industry, the upside was a vast inflow of assets into mutual funds from defined
contribution plans.72
When mutual funds manage retirement plan assets, they become subject to
regulation by the Department of Labor (“DOL”), which is charged with enforcing
63

William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund
Industry, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1401, 1412–13 (2006) (providing an historical overview).
64
Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa) and Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat.
881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm) respectively.
65
Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64) and Pub. L. No.
768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21) respectively.
66
See John Morley, Why Do Investment Funds Have Special Securities Regulation? in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE REGULATION OF MONETARY FUNDS, WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE & JOHN MORLEY, EDS.
(Edward Elgar 2018).
67
Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 11, 14–16
(2006).
68
Id.
69
29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461.
70
On the distinction between the two, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114
YALE L.J. 451 (2004):
A defined benefit pension, as its name implies, specifies an output for the participant.
Traditionally, such plans defined benefits for particular employees based on the
employees' respective salary histories and their periods of employment. …
In contrast, a defined contribution arrangement, as its equally apt moniker indicates,
specifies an input for the participant. Commonly, the plan defines the employer's
contribution for each participant as a percentage of the participant's salary for that year.
Having made that contribution, the employer's obligation to fund is over because the
employee is not guaranteed a particular benefit, just a specified input.
Id., at 455-56.
71
The downside was that the employee instead of the employer bore investment risk, transforming every
American worker, through her defined contribution account, into a capitalist. See Martin Gelter, The
Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 911 (2013) (arguing
that pension system reform broadly transformed middle class interests from pro-labor to pro-capital).
72
Inflows accelerated upon realization that §401(k), added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1978, allowed
tax deferral on investment gains until retirement. See BIRDTHISTLE, supra note XX, at 22-23 (describing
the birth of the 401(k) and the rise of individual investing). Inflows increased further with subsequent
changes to tax laws affecting Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”) in the early 1980s. See Zelinsky,
supra note 70, at 485-88.
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ERISA.73 For such funds, DOL regulation is in addition to SEC regulation. 74 Of course,
not all mutual funds are sold within retirement plans, and not all fund advisors act as plan
fiduciaries under ERISA. Nevertheless, within large mutual fund families, especially
those with centralized policies, the voting practices of funds that do not manage plan
assets are likely to be influenced by the family’s need to comply with DOL requirements
for those funds that do manage plan assets. 75
The regulatory requirements imposed by the DOL and by the SEC differ on the
subject of voting. The DOL unambiguously requires managers of plan assets to vote
portfolio company shares.76 Still, some ambiguity remains over the factors plan
fiduciaries can weigh in proxy voting. In Obama-era guidance, the DOL had taken the
position that it would be appropriate for managers of plan assets to weigh environmental,
social, and governance issues in proxy voting. 77 More recent DOL guidance issued under
the Trump administration, however, qualifies their freedom to consider factors not clearly
related to investment returns.78 Any lingering ambiguity in the DOL’s regulation of
73

BIRDTHISTLE, supra note XX, at 142 (“Fidelity Investments, Vanguard Group, and TIAA-CREF are
among the biggest and most prominent vendors of defined contribution plans and IRAs. Often, the firms
that advise mutual funds also provide the 401(k) plans to U.S. corporations.”).
74
Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory Damage, 92 Tulane L. Rev.
339 (describing how the DOL under ERISA operates as a kind of shadow-regulator to the SEC).
75
Most mutual fund families formulate centralized voting policies. See infra notes 102-111 and
accompanying text.
76
The DOL first articulated its position in a series of letter rulings. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz,
Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc.
(Feb. 23, 1988) (Feb. 29, 1988) (reprinted in 15 PENSION REP. (BNA) 71, 391) (“The decision[s] as to how
proxies should be voted ... are fiduciary acts of plan asset management.”); Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz,
Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Robert Monks, Institutional S’holder Servs, Inc. 3 (Jan. 23,
1990) (reprinted in 17 PENSION REP. (BNA) 244) (“The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are
shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”). These
rulings were later reaffirmed in guidelines stating that “the fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are
shares of corporate stock includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares of stock.”
Dep’t of Labor, Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
73 Fed. Reg. 61,732 (Oct. 17, 2008).
77
Dep’t of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin 2016-01 (“IB 2016-01”), codified at 29 CFR § 2509.2016-01
(stating that plan fiduciaries may engage through voting on a range of issues, including “policies and
practices to address environmental or social factors that have an impact on shareholder value, and other
financial and non-financial measures of corporate performance”). Other Obama-era guidance held that
plan fiduciaries could choose investments on the basis of ESG goals, provided that the choice of the better
ESG investment had shareholder returns at least as good as the alternative. ESG factors, in other words,
could serve as the tie-breaker between two otherwise equal investments. Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01 (“IB
2015-01”), codified at 29 CFR § 2509.2015-01.2015-1 (stating that “plan fiduciaries may invest [on the
basis of] … collateral benefits so long as the investment is economically equivalent, with respect to return
and risk to beneficiaries in the appropriate time horizon, to investments without such collateral benefits”).
78
Dep’t of Labor, Field Assistance Bulletin, 2018-1 (“FAB 2018-1”). (noting that the expenditure of plan
assets “to actively engage with management on environmental or social factors, either directly or through
the plan’s investment manager” would warrant “a documented analysis of the cost of the shareholder
activity compared to the expected economic benefit (gain) over an appropriate investment horizon”). FAB
2018-1 also qualified IB 2015-1 in advising that investments could be chosen on the basis of their
environmental and social attributes only when those consideration increase investment returns—for
example, by mitigating a risk that would have an economic effect on the subject company. The bulletin
states:
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proxy voting thus reflects conflicting positions taken by successive administrations on the
weight that plan fiduciaries may accord to ESG factors—that is, how they vote. The
more fundamental rule—that plan fiduciaries must vote—remains unchanged.
The SEC’s position is less clear. In 2003, the SEC issued a series of rules
designed to clarify intermediaries’ voting responsibilities.79 This rule-making arose out
of perceived conflicts of interest in the voting of proxies and made three changes relevant
here.80 First, it required investment advisors, as fiduciaries, to adopt and implement a
voting policy “consistent with the best interest of its client.” 81 Second, it required funds
to disclose voting policies and procedures to investors.82 Finally, it required funds to
disclose how they voted portfolio company shares. 83
These rules do not necessarily require mutual funds to vote. They merely require
funds to adopt a policy and follow it.84 The SEC affirmed this principle in guidance
To the extent ESG factors, in fact, involve business risks or opportunities that are
properly treated as economic considerations themselves in evaluating alternative
investments, the weight given to those factors should also be appropriate to the relative
level of risk and return involved compared to other relevant economic factors.
Fiduciaries must not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant…. Rather,
ERISA fiduciaries must always put first the economic interests of the plan in providing
retirement benefits. A fiduciary’s evaluation of the economics of an investment should be
focused on financial factors that have a material effect on the return and risk of an
investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan’s
articulated funding and investment objectives.
FAB 2018-1. In this way, the Trump-era guidance from the DOL allows plan fiduciaries to consider ESG
issues only insofar as they can be shown to have a positive effect on investment returns, not as an otherwise
desirable attribute that can be used to distinguish between two economically equal investments.
79
Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2003) [hereinafter Advisers’ Voting Rule]);
Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239. 249, 270, 274) (2003)
([hereinafter Voting Disclosure Rule].
80
The conflict here is what Dorothy Lund and I have elsewhere referred to as “Corporate Client Conflict.”
See Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, __ B.U. L. REV.
___ (forthcoming 2019).
81
Advisers’ Voting Rule 206(4)-6(a) (including a requirement that the policy describe how the advisor
resolves “material conflicts that may arise between your interests and those of your clients”).
82
Voting Disclosure Rule (requiring funds to disclose voting policies and procedures as part of their
“statement of additional information,” filed on EDGAR and provided to investors upon request).
83
Id. (adopting Investment Company Act rule 30b1-4 to require funds to disclose their complete proxy
voting record on an annual basis on Form N-PX).
84
Other rules relieved advisors of liability for voting according to a predetermined policy delegating voting
determinations to third-party proxy advisors. According to the SEC:
An adviser that votes securities based on a pre-determined voting policy could
demonstrate that its vote was not a product of a conflict of interest if the application of
the policy to the matter presented to shareholders involved little discretion on the part of
the adviser. Similarly, an adviser could demonstrate that the vote was not a product of a
conflict of interest if it voted client securities, in accordance with a pre-determined
policy, based upon the recommendations of an independent third party.
Advisers’ Voting Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6588. This rule and related letter rulings that form the basis of the
proxy advisory businesses of such firms as ISS and Glass Lewis are currently under review as the SEC
reconsiders the proxy voting process. See Joe Mont, Withdrawal of Past Guidance Signals a Contentious
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issued in 2014.85 In Staff Legal Bulletin 20, the SEC directly addressed the question
whether “an investment advisor [is] required to vote every proxy.” 86 In response to this
question, the SEC answered that advisors and clients could expressly agree: (1) to
conserve resources by not voting on specific types of proposals or companies; (2) to cast
all votes cast in favor of management; (3) to abstain from voting any proxies at all; and
(4) to focus exclusively on particular types of proposals.87 Although clear in emphasizing
flexibility, by also stressing the importance of an express agreement, the SEC did not
answer whether, without such an agreement, fund advisors must vote every proxy.
What has become the standard practice of mutual funds—to vote all of their
shares all of the time—may thus be understood as a response to this regulatory
environment. Funds regulated by the DOL have no choice in the matter.88 But even
funds not regulated by the DOL may vote as a form of risk management. Consider the
regulatory risk of a mutual fund advisor: SEC rules clearly make investment advisors
fiduciaries with regard to voting, yet unlike the DOL, the SEC does not specify the
content of an advisor’s fiduciary duties with respect to voting. An advisor may therefore
reason that given the absence of a good distinction between retirement fund fiduciary
duties and mutual fund fiduciary duties, voting is the safest course. Furthermore, a
mutual fund advisor may reason that failing to vote would waste an important element of
share value—i.e., the voting rights inherent in the share—and, because waste plainly does
not comport with fiduciary duty, vote. Although the theory of delegated voting
articulated in this article supports neither of these interpretations of fiduciary duty, an
advisor could be excused for voting to minimize regulatory risk. The situation is made
worse by the SEC’s failure to clearly state that not voting is an acceptable default option
in the absence of express authorization. Under the current regulatory structure, mutual
funds may reasonably conclude that they had better vote all of their shares all of the time.

C. Stewardship Groups
Formerly, mutual funds managed the burden of voting portfolio company shares
largely by outsourcing voting decisions in whole or in part to the judgment of a proxy
advisor.89 More recently, in response to widespread criticism of proxy advisory firms

Start
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SEC’s
Proxy
Process
Review,
COMPLIANCE
WK.
(Sept.
25,
2018),
https://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-article/withdrawal-of-past-guidance-signals-a-contentiousstart-to-secs-proxy-process#.XEz0TlxKgzM.
85
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. INV. MGMT., DIV. CORP. FIN., PROXY VOTING: PROXY VOTING
RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPTIONS FROM THE PROXY RULES
FOR PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS, STAFF LEGAL BULL. NO. 20 (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter STAFF LEGAL BULL.
20].
86
Id.
87
STAFF LEGAL BULL. 20, Answer to Question 2.
88
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89
See Stephen J. Choi, et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality? 59 EMORY L. J. 869 (2010)
(examining empirically the influence of proxy advisor recommendations on mutual fund voting).
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and regulatory pressure to move away from that model,90 fund families have brought
voting decisions in-house, often allocating voting responsibilities to a centralized
“stewardship” group.91 Stewardship groups are small relative to the enormity of their
charge. As of October 2016 at the Big Three, for example, the ratio of portfolio company
investments per stewardship group member was approximately 700:1 at BlackRock,
867:1 at Vanguard, and 900:1 at State Street.92 The numbers are especially striking
compared to the 5-15 companies covered by a typical equity analyst. 93
Stewardship groups develop and work from a set of guidelines laying out a
standard approach to recurring governance issues. 94 These voting guidelines of each of
the Big Three, for example, announce voting positions against staggered boards,95 poison
pills96 and dual class shares.97 These positions lack nuance.98 In spite of recent research

90

Scholars have critiqued the proxy advisory model. See, e.g,. Tao Li, Outsourcing Corporate
Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry, 64 MGMT. SCI. 2951 (2018)
(providing evidence of conflicts in the proxy advisory industry); Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko,
Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters, J. FIN. (forthcoming), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757597 (showing that proxy advisory services generally do not lead to more
informed voting). On the SEC’s movement away from the proxy advisory model, see supra note 11.
91
See, e.g., Glenn Booream, Vanguard Investment Stewardship Commentary: What We Do; How We Do It;
Why It Matters, Apr. 2019 (describing the structure and goals of stewardship).
92
See Krouse et al., supra note 3.
93
See, e.g., Wall Street Prep, Investment Banking vs Equity Research, available at
https://www.wallstreetprep.com/knowledge/investment-banking-vs-equity-research/
(“Since
equity
research analysts generally focus on a small group of stocks (5-15) within particular industries or
geographic regions, they become experts in the specific companies and industry or “coverage universe” that
they analyze.”).
94
See Blackrock, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities, Jan. 2019 [hereinafter, Blackrock
Guidelines]; State Street Global Advisers, Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines, North America, Mar.
2019 [hereinafter State Street Guidelines]; Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Portfolio
Companies, Apr. 1, 2019 [hereinafter Vanguard Guidelines].
95
See Blackrock Guidelines, at 5 (“We believe that directors should be re-elected annually…. While there
may be exceptions, we will typically support proposals requesting board declassification.”); State Street
Guidelines, at 4 (“We generally support annual elections for the board of directors.”); Vanguard
Guidelines, at 16 (“A fund will vote for proposals to declassify an existing board and vote against
management or shareholder proposals to create a classified board.”).
96
See BlackRock Guidelines, at 9 (“We generally vote in favor of shareholder proposals to rescind poison
pills.”); State Street Guidelines, at 6 (“We will support mandates requiring shareholder approval of a
shareholder rights plans … and repeals of various anti-takeover related provisions. In general, we will vote
against the adoption or renewal of a US issuer’s shareholder rights plan.”); Vanguard Guidelines, at 17 (“A
fund will generally vote against adoption of poison pill proposals and for shareholder proposals to rescind
poison pills, unless company-specific circumstances necessitate providing the board and management
reasonable time and protection to guide the company’s strategy without excessive short-term distractions.
This analysis would typically require engagements with both the company and the acquirer/activist.”). The
BlackRock statement on poison pills includes an interesting variation:
Although we oppose most plans, we may support plans that include a reasonable
“qualifying offer clause.” … These clauses … tend to specify that an all cash bid for all
shares that includes a fairness opinion and evidence of financing does not trigger the pill,
but forces either a special meeting at which the offer is put to a shareholder vote, or the
board to seek the written consent of shareholders where shareholders could rescind the
pill at their discretion.
BlackRock Guidelines, at 9.
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showing that these provisions can create value for some firms, 99 stewardship group
guidelines announce a one-size-fits-all approach to governance. 100 However, the
standardized approach of voting guidelines may be somewhat tempered by stewardship
groups’ discretion in deciding whether to follow them in a particular case. 101
Stewardship groups aim to achieve uniformity in voting across all funds within
the family,102 often without distinguishing between active and passive funds or other
differences in fund strategy.103 Fund families defend uniform voting policies for reasons
97

See Blackrock Guidelines, at 8 (“BlackRock believes that shareholders should be entitled to voting rights
in proportion to their economic interests. … Companies should receive shareholder approval of their capital
structure on a periodic basis via a management proposal on the company’s proxy.”); State Street
Guidelines, at 5 (“We will not support proposals authorizing the creation of new classes of common stock
with superior voting rights and will vote against new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting,
conversion, dividend distribution, and other rights.”); Vanguard Guidelines, at 17 (noting philosophical
approval of “one-share, one-vote” structures while remaining “mindful of the need to not hinder public
capital formation” therefore announcing support of sunset provisions for newly public, dual-class stock,
and stating that funds will “vote case-by-case on proposals to eliminate dual-class share structures”).
98
Exceptions may include BlackRock’s discussion of “qualifying offer clause” poison pills and Vanguard’s
discussion of dual class stock. See supra notes 96 and 97.
99
See infra notes 249-252 and accompanying text (describing current research on staggered boards), notes
257-258 and accompanying text (describing current research on poison pills), and notes 253-255 and
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company…”); Vanguard Guidelines, at 1 (“It is important to note that these are only guidelines, and that
Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team, on behalf of the funds, may vote differently to the extent it is in
the best interests of a fund and its shareholders.”)
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MORNINGSTAR MANAGER RESEARCH, PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO
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of “consistency and efficacy” and also because they “minimize potential conflicts of
interest…[which] arise when views of internal portfolio managers differ between each
other and with the stewardship team.”104 Consistent with these preferences, fund families
deliver impressive uniformity in voting. For example, in 2015, only 195 out of 100,000
(or less than 2%) proposals at State Street featured a fund voting differently than its other
funds; at Vanguard, only 6 per 100,000 (.0006%) proposals received differing votes. 105
Other fund complexes maintain a preference for consistency but allow for
divergent voting.106 At BlackRock, for example, active fund managers can depart from
the stewardship group’s view if they disagree with it.107 Nonetheless, at BlackRock in
2015, in only 18 per 100,000 (or .018%) proposals did one of its funds vote differently
from the others.108 Similarly, T. Rowe Price’s fund managers have discretion to cast the
funds’ votes contrary to the recommendation of the stewardship group, but a manager
who exercises this discretion must document her reasons for doing so. 109 At the more
extreme end of the spectrum is AIM/Invesco, which not only allows its funds vote
differently from each other, but which also allows funds to promulgate and follow
different voting policies.110 Another exception is Fidelity, the sole mutual fund complex
that delegates its voting for its index funds to a sub-advisor and, perhaps as a result,
displays higher levels of disagreement in its proxy voting, with funds diverging in 3,144
per 100,000 (or 3.14%) of votes.111
Uniform voting may be in the fund family’s interest even if it is not in the interest
of individual funds and their investors. 112 Fund families maximize their influence
through uniform voting. If funds voted on their own, with some voting one way on an
issue while others voted the other way, their votes would cancel each other out, reducing
the influence of the fund complex over the outcome. Instead, by delivering large uniform

consultation with the portfolio managers of their active funds, but typically not index managers.
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blocks of votes, mutual fund complexes, especially the Big Three, often dictate the
outcome of contested votes113 and shareholder proposals.114
Stewardship programs may serve fund families’ interests in another way as well.
Although leanly staffed, stewardship programs are costly. Stewards must be paid.
Moreover, the costs of stewardship do not scale with AUM. All broadly diversified
mutual funds face similar costs in researching and developing positions on governance
and voting, regardless whether the fund has millions of dollars under management or
billions. Non-scalable costs are easier for large fund families to absorb than small ones.
This makes stewardship a potential barrier to entry. By pushing the fund industry (and its
regulators) towards stewardship and away from more cost effective voting solutions such
as proxy advisors or simply not voting, large mutual fund families may be able to protect
themselves against new entrants and smaller competitors.115
The extent to which stewardship programs may be worthwhile from the
perspective of mutual fund investors, as opposed to fund families, is a question that
remains to be answered. Before we can grapple with it, however, we must have a sense
of what mutual fund investors might hope to achieve through the voting rights inherent in
portfolio company shares. This requires a theory of shareholder voting and, more
specifically, a theory of delegated voting. These are the subjects of the next Part.

III.

Toward a Theory of Delegated Voting

Understanding investors’ preferences with respect to voting entails a vision of
what shareholder voting is for. What end is sought by giving shareholders voting rights?
And what can shareholders hope to accomplish through voting? The answers to these
questions will guide the analysis of when and whether mutual fund investors would
prefer to delegate their votes to a mutual fund intermediary. Answering them, however,
requires a theory of shareholder voting. This Part first uncovers the basis of mainstream
theories of shareholder voting, including principle criticisms of those theories, then
applies those theories to voting by mutual fund intermediaries.
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A. A Baseline Account of Shareholder Voting
Asking what shareholder voting is for necessarily imports a vision of purpose,
what corporate investors want from voting. In the words of Easterbrook and Fischel:
‘Why do shareholders vote?’ is three questions in one. First, why do any
investors have voting rights? Second, why do shareholders alone have
voting rights? Third, why do shareholders exercise their voting rights? 116
Corporate voting, in other words, must be understood in the context of the investment
relationship as a whole, in which voting is linked with residual risk. Ultimately,
shareholders bear the marginal cost and receive the marginal gains of corporate
actions.117 Although other stakeholders, most notably creditors and employees, also bear
risk, their risk is fixed by contract and thus limited by terms to which they have agreed. 118
As residual risk-bearers, shareholders are exposed to the consequences of all corporate
actions going forward.119 This gives shareholders the best incentive of all corporate
constituents to monitor corporate decision-making. 120 Hence, shareholders alone vote.121
In closely-held corporations—firms in which shareholders are few and wellinformed—shareholders may decide everything through voting. 122 But for widely-held
firms, and especially publicly-traded firms, this form of decision-making is impossible.
When there are a great many shareholders, many of them are likely to be uninformed
about corporate matters, and their general preferences are likely to diverge, making it
impossible for them to cohere around a stable course of action.123 Publicly-traded firms
116
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therefore delegate corporate decision-making to directors and managers. 124 Voting input
is then provided over a much smaller range of issues—the election of directors, 125 the
amendment of the charter or bylaws, 126 the approval of fundamental changes such as
mergers,127 sales of substantially all assets,128 and dissolution,129 as well as advisory votes
and precatory proposals.130
From these foundations, two basic conceptions of the role of shareholder voting in
publicly traded corporations have emerged, which I will refer to as “minimalist” and
“maximalist.” According to the minimalist conception, shareholder voting serves merely
as a mechanism to contain managerial agency costs.131 Shareholders vote only to prevent
managers from straying too far from shareholders’ best interests. Meanwhile, a
“maximalist,” or at least non-minimalist, conception of shareholder voting sees it as a
means of surfacing information concerning investor preferences to managers so that
managers may steer corporate actions closer to the interests of their investor base. 132
Shareholders may possess better information than management with regard to their own
preferences, including for example, the reservation value at which they hold corporate
shares, their investment time horizons, and tax preferences. 133 Voting may be an efficient
way to gather information on diffusely held preferences. 134
Nevertheless, both minimalist and maximalist accounts of shareholder voting are
aligned on an underlying, often implicit, vision of purpose. Disparate though their other
preferences may be, shareholders are presumed to have a uniform interest in maximizing
their own wealth.135 The assumption facilitates both management and monitoring—
management because shareholder wealth maximization gives corporate agents an
unambiguous mandate, and monitoring because it gives shareholders a simple metric by
which to judge the performance of management. Shareholder wealth maximization is
124
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reducible, essentially, to return on equity, which in efficient markets, can be simplified
even further to share price. Because such metrics are easily observable, they greatly
facilitate shareholders’ task of gathering and analyzing information necessary to vote
intelligently. Such easy metrics also make it harder for managers to conceal poor
performance relative to peer-firms, thus facilitating shareholder decisions on such matters
as takeovers and proxy contests.
Commentators have long objected to this pinched vision of corporate purpose.136
Recently, a strand of law and economics scholarship has also argued that this account of
purpose is both descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable. 137 These scholars
point out that the law does not require shareholder wealth maximization but rather creates
discretion for managers to sacrifice profits in favor of other interests. 138 Insofar as
corporate managers do put other goals ahead of wealth maximization, they are
constrained principally by non-legal means. 139 Furthermore, given that their shareholders
undoubtedly have non-pecuniary interests and motivations,140 it may be efficient for
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shareholders to satisfy these interests through their investments.141 As described by Hart
and Zingales:
[M]oney-making and ethical activities are often inseparable. Consider the
case of Walmart selling high-capacity magazines of the sort used in mass
killings. If shareholders are concerned about mass killings, transferring
profit to shareholders to spend on gun control might not be as efficient as
banning the sales of high-capacity magazines in the first place. 142
This challenge is generalizable to an array of corporate activities that offend some social
interest: from the manufacture and sale of guns and to the manufacture and sale of
abortifacients. For Hart and Zingales, the solution is voting. They would expand the
ability of shareholders to vote to push management to act on a broader set of interests. 143
Their solution, in other words, is a maximalist conception of voting but with a broader
mandate—welfare instead of wealth. Other theorists go further, arguing that a broad
conception of corporation, imbued with social purpose, should be implemented by
regulation.144
But these objections misconstrue the role of wealth maximization in two ways.
First, shareholder wealth maximization is often posited or assumed not because it is the
highest and best thing for real life shareholders but because it is the most we can assume
about shareholders as a class.145 It does not rest upon the results of a poll of shareholder
passions but rather operates as a kind of lowest common denominator solution to their
inability to coalesce around other objectives. 146 Indeed, government failures to advance
particular social objectives, frustrating to critics of wealth maximization, may reflect the
divergent preferences of the political electorate, but these critics have supplied no reason
to suppose that corporate electorates will not have similarly divergent preferences. 147
Unless and until such preferences coalesce around a constituency sufficiently stable to
challenge to leadership of the firm, they are disregarded. This explains what Lipton has
described as the “central, unresolved tension” underlying the corporate structure:
[D]irectors are (nominally) selected by shareholders and tasked with
advancing shareholders’ desire for wealth maximization, but shareholders
141
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themselves may not share that goal. At the same time, the shareholder
franchise is justified by their (presumed) preference for wealth
maximization, but they are also kept subordinate and powerless, because
they may not favor wealth maximization.148
This is not a bug but a feature. Wealth maximization operates as a form of agenda
control.149 It is not shareholders’ most cherished goal but rather, to paraphrase
Churchill’s famous dictum about democracy, the least bad of the alternatives. 150
Second, positing shareholder wealth as the basic corporate maximand does not
restrict shareholders, who remain free to invest or vote in any way they like. Rather, it
restricts their agents, who are rendered accountable to a clear constituency according to a
clear set of metrics. Managers cannot openly depart from this maximand without facing
fiduciary-duty litigation, takeover, or a proxy fight. Shareholders, by contrast, remain
free to invest and vote according to other interests and objectives. 151 Recently, for
example, a group of nuns won a shareholder proposal opposed by the parent company of
gun-manufacturer Smith & Wesson to force the company to report back to shareholders
on efforts to curtail gun violence. 152 In doing so, the nuns acted appropriately as
principals, and the managers, in resisting them, acted appropriately as agents. The
assumption of shareholder wealth maximization constrains agents, not principals.
It is notable, however, that the nuns’ proposal was successful in large part because
of the support of large mutual fund complexes, notably including BlackRock and
Vanguard, which voted with the nuns.153 Mutual fund intermediaries are agents of their
investors. Because the assumption of shareholder wealth maximization is meant to bind
agents, in voting as they did, the mutual fund intermediaries may have departed from
their proper bounds. These and other complications introduced by intermediary voting
are discussed in further detail below.

B. The Delegation of Voting Rights to Mutual Funds
Mutual funds are intermediaries with voting rights. As large block-holders,
institutional intermediaries have the potential to address the monitoring deficiencies of
rationally apathetic individual investors.154 At the same time, because mutual funds do
not receive the economic benefit of the shares they hold, conferring voting authority on
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mutual fund intermediaries introduces agency costs and conflicts. 155 A delegation of
voting authority to mutual funds must therefore balance the downside of
disintermediation (rational apathy) with the downside of intermediation (agency costs and
conflicts).156
Agency costs arise from agents’ incentives to work less diligently for someone
else than they would if they captured the full value of their work for themselves. 157
Agency cost problems are a central concern between shareholders and managers in the
corporate context,158 but there the potential of agency defections is mitigated by a
relatively robust array of incentives and constraints.159 Conflicts are also pervasive
between mutual fund intermediaries and their investors.160 But in the mutual fund
context, the mechanisms to align incentives are weak or non-existent. 161 As a result,
Bebchuk and Hirst explain the apparent laxity in mutual fund stewardship programs as a
function of agency costs.162
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In other work, Dorothy Lund and I have grouped recurrent mutual fund conflicts
into three paradigmatic forms: “Cross-Ownership Conflict,” “Corporate Client Conflict,”
and “Uniform Policy Conflict.”163 The first, Cross-Ownership Conflict, involves
situations in which a fund holding interests on both sides of a transaction votes contrary
to one side in order to increase the return to the side in which it has a larger economic
stake.164 The second, Corporate Client Conflict, involves situations in which fund
managers’ voting decisions are influenced by their own interest in currying favor with the
managers of subject companies, perhaps driven by the desire to become the company’s
401(k) provider or sell other advisory services. 165 The third, Uniform Policy Conflict,
arises from the fact, noted above, that mutual fund complexes typically vote their
portfolio shares uniformly without regard to the potentially differing objectives of the
various funds through which they hold shares. Because funds often have divergent
interests, Uniform Policy Conflict gives rise to a predictable set of sub-conflicts, some of
which arise between the complex and its investors directly, others of which arise between
investors in different funds.
Conflicts between funds in the same family can arise from investment
objectives—growth versus income, for example, or the differing time-horizons of various
target-date funds166—or they may arise between different fund types—for example, debt
versus equity.167 Uniform voting policies also create conflicts between fund complexes
and their investors. As one example, consider a merger vote creating divergent returns
for the active and index funds managed by a fund complex. Considering that fund
complexes typically derive more fee income from their active funds, it may be in the
interest of the complex to cast index fund votes to maximize active fund returns, thereby
harming the interests of index fund investors.168
Another conflict between funds and their investors may arise when fund families
adapt social issues to their own ends. Most notable in this regard may be BlackRock’s
2018 letter to investors in which the CEO took the position that “every company must not
only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to
society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders,
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Griffith & Lund, supra note 80.
Id., at PIN (citing the example of the Tesla-Solar City merger). Although conflicting interests among
shareholders creates a problem for corporate law, it does not necessarily entail conflicting interests among
investors in the fund, all of whom would prefer fund management to vote in the way that most increased
fund value. Cross-Ownership Conflict is therefore not a central concern of this article.
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Id. at PIN. Aspects of Corporate Client Conflict has been noted by various scholars going back at least
to the first wave of commentary on institutional investors. See, e.g., Black, supra note 17, at 595–608
(noting the conflict from mutual fund advisors’ interest in providing corporate 401(k) accounts).
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Vanguard, for example, offers 129 different mutual funds, including target-date funds that span
retirement dates from 2015 to 2065. See Vanguard Mutual Funds, VANGUARD,
https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/list#/mutual-funds/asset-class/month-end-returns (last visited
Jan. 27, 2019).
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Griffith & Lund, supra note 80, at PIN.
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Id. at PIN. Lest this seem speculative, there is evidence that mutual fund complexes coordinate voting
in precisely this way. See Jose-Miguel Gaspar et al., Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on
Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73, 74 (2006).
164

27

employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.” 169 Although some
commentators have dismissed the letter, it is broadly consistent with BlackRock’s
commitment to act on shareholder proposals concerning social issues, especially gun
policy.170 As noted above, BlackRock’s support was essential in passing the nuns’
proposal on guns.171
Putting aside one’s own position on the substance of such issues, one can posit
several potential reasons why a mutual fund complex might stake out a strong voting
position on social issues. First, such a position might serve the personal interest of the
CEO, either in advancing her own preferences or in winning praise in the elite circle she
inhabits.172 Second, taking a strong position on social issues might help the fund family
attract clients, such as university endowments, for whom a demonstration of social values
is important. Likewise, displaying such values might also aid the fund family in
employee recruitment and retention. Third, having a reputation for social responsibility
might help the fund family avoid government regulation. 173 It is notable, for example,
that the BlackRock CEO’s letter in January 2018 foreshadowed themes of Senator
Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act, announced in August of that year. 174 It
may be that by articulating the same goals a few months in advance, the CEO sought to
spare the fund industry or at least his own firm the political pressure then being directed
at public companies.175
Whatever the case may be, it is important to note that none of these potential
motivations advances the interests of mutual fund investors. 176 Many investors will, of
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See Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs:
Purpose & Profit, BLACKROCK (2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter. [Also note 2019 letter here]
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See supra. See also Press Release: BlackRock’s Approach to Companies that Manufacture and
Distribute
Civilian
Firearms,
BLACKROCK
(Mar.
2,
2018),
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See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
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The BlackRock CEO’s 2018 letter was released in the days leading up to the World Economic Forum at
Davos, and the CEO did television interviews from Davos on the topic of the letter. See, e.g., CNBC
TRANSCRIPT: BLACKROCK CHAIRMAN & CEO LARRY FINK SPEAKS WITH SQUAWK BOX FROM DAVOS
TODAY, Jan. 24, 2018, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24/cnbc-transcript-blackrock-chairmanceo-larry-fink-speaks-with-squawk-box-from-davos-today.html.
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See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 22, at PIN.
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See Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
14,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-to-shareholders1534287687 (announcing the proposed legislation).
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Or perhaps the themes of the letter improved the CEO’s standing as a candidate for Secretary of the
Treasury under a Democratic administration. See Stephen Gandel, BlackRock’s Larry Fink May Be
Stepping Up his Play for Treasury Secretary, Fortune, Feb. 4, 2016, available online at
https://fortune.com/2016/02/04/blackrock-larry-fink-treasury-secretary/ (identifying consistencies between
BlackRock letters and the policy concerns of Democratic Presidential candidates and speculation on Wall
Street and Washington that Fink was putting himself forward as a candidate for Treasury Secretary).
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Consistent with the divergence between fund and investor incentives with regard to voting, recent
research finds that institutional investor voting patterns differ substantially from those of retail investors,
especially with regard to environmental and social proposals, which institutional investors are substantially
more likely to support. See Alon Brav, Matthew D. Cain & Jonathon Zytnick, Retail Shareholder
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course, disagree with the substance of these positions, and to the extent that BlackRock
casts not only its “social responsibility fund” votes but rather votes uniformly on such
issues, it necessary votes contrary to some investors’ interests. Moreover, the impact of
such votes is not merely political. It is economic. For example, to the extent that
pressure from BlackRock persuades retailers not to sell firearms to anyone under the age
of 21, the fund complex effectively reduces portfolio company revenues from sales in
states where younger persons can legally buy firearms.177 This harms not only “pro-gun”
investors, it harms all shareholders concerned with wealth maximization. Again,
whatever one’s position on the underlying policy issue, when mutual fund complexes
leverage their investors’ votes to advocate for interests on one side, they necessarily act
contrary to the interests of other investors.
The simplest approach to these problems is to realign mutual fund voting with the
baseline theory of shareholder voting described above. When agents act for shareholders,
they must assume a common purpose of shareholder wealth maximization. Shareholderprincipals, like the nuns holding shares of gun-makers, are free to act according to any
preference they may hold.178 But mutual funds are agents, not principals, and as such,
they should therefore be constrained by wealth maximization as the only preference that
can plausibly be assumed to be shared by all investors.179 Mutual funds should therefore
vote only to maximize shareholder wealth.
One might object that mutual fund investors are not ordinary shareholders.
Insofar as they invest in broadly diversified investment vehicles, they are, by definition,
diversified investors.180 Because they are diversified, mutual fund investors care about
portfolio value, not individual firm value. Thus, insofar as a pro-social agenda—the
prevention of climate change, for example—would increase the value of the portfolio as a
whole, even if it reduced value of individual firms in the portfolio, mutual fund investors
should favor it, and mutual fund intermediaries, as agents of those principals and voting
purely on the basis of investor wealth maximization, should favor it too.
The objection fails, however, because it imputes to mutual fund beneficiaries
knowledge that they could not possibly possess. To see this, consider that pro-social
actions may increase or reduce value, either of firms or of portfolios. This creates a set of
possibilities that can be mapped onto the following matrix:
(1) Benefit Firm, Benefit Portfolio

(2) Benefit Firm, Harm Portfolio

Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting (May 15, 2019), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3387659.
177
See generally NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. O'SHEA,
FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS, 2ND ED. (Aspen 2017)
(summarizing the firearms laws of various states).
178
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
179
See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
180
See also Gregory Scott Crespi, Maximizing the Wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should
Directors Embrace?, 32 J. Corp. L. 381 (2007) (arguing that differences in the conceptualizing the idealtype corporate shareholder, especially with regard to diversification, have important implications for
corporate law and theory).
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(3) Harm Firm, Benefit Portfolio

(4) Harm Firm, Harm Portfolio

The first observation to make from this matrix that that boxes (1) and (2), both of which
involve actions to increase firm value, will occur without the need for shareholder
engagement.181 Management has strong incentives to implement actions that will
increase firm value and, given its access to private information about the firm, a
comparative advantage vis-à-vis shareholders, whether individual or institutional, in
knowing how to do so.182 Likewise, management will refuse to implement actions in
boxes (3) and (4) on the basis of their own incentives because these actions harm the
firm.
The crux of the objection, then, turns on the distinction between box (3) and box
(4). On its own, management will pursue neither. However, insofar as actions harm the
firm but benefit the portfolio, portfolio-holders would presumably prefer that those
actions be taken. Hence there may be a role for portfolio-holders in pushing managers
towards box (3). But two questions arise here. First, is voting to bring about box (3) ever
appropriate? In other words, is it ever permissible to vote to harm one firm in order to
benefit another? And second, who is in the best position to decide whether a prospective
action falls in box (3) or box (4)? Who has the comparative advantage in deciding how
an action will affect the portfolio as a whole?
With regard to the first question, it is worth noting that there are portfolios and
then there are portfolios. Mutual funds are not the only shareholders who assemble
portfolios. Banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds,
and individual shareholders also assemble and manage portfolios. Not all of these
portfolio-holders are broadly diversified. Indeed, not all mutual funds, even index funds,
are broadly diversified. Many focus on a few firms or an industry sector. Even funds
based on broadly diversified indices, including the S&P 500, are weighted by market
capitalization such that much of their return is driven by a few large firms. 183 Broadly
diversified fund portfolios may also overweight particular industries. Again, this is true
of the S&P 500, approximately half of which consists of information technology, health
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Box (2) may be difficult to imagine as pro-social. But it is at least possible that some pro-social change
(e.g., banning fossil fuels) would help an individual firm (e.g., a maker of solar panels) but harm the
portfolio as a whole. In any event, nothing in the argument turns on box (2).
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This may not apply when the relevant action is a governance change that would have the effect of
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S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P U.S. Indices Methodology, Apr. 2019, at 9 (“Each index is weighted by
float-adjusted market capitalization.”). There is also considerable discretion embedded in the selection of
companies for the index, rendering its value as a benchmark of “passive” investing highly questionable.
See Adriana Z. Robertson, The (Mis)uses of the S&P 500 (working paper).
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care, and financial companies.184 The voting incentives for holders of such portfolios
would seem to favor the interests of industries in which they are overweight. 185 Because
few if any mutual funds, even indexes, hold “the market,” the market-wide perspective
exists in hypothetical form only. However, because mutual fund fiduciary duties are
owed to real life investors of specific funds, managers are compelled to maximize on the
basis of the actual portfolios they have assembled, not on the basis of a hypothetical
perspective that exists nowhere in reality. The elision of portfolio voting with a marketwide perspective and the potential further elision of a market-wide perspective with prosocial perspective turns out to be illusory as applied to the real world of mutual funds.
More broadly, when if ever, is it appropriate for a portfolio-holder to vote
intentionally to damage a company in favor of another interest or another company in the
portfolio? The question raises concerns at the heart of classic Perry-Mylan example in
which a hedge fund with shares on both sides planned to vote its buy-side shares in favor
of a deal that was extremely disadvantageous to the buyer because the fund had hedged
away its buy-side exposure and was overweight on the sell-side. 186 Voting intentionally
to harm a company is contrary to public policy,187 inconsistent with the core rationales
for shareholder voting, whether minimalist or maximalist,188 and likely contrary to
Delaware law.189 Yet it is the crux of box (3) voting. The dubious legality of voting to
harm a portfolio company may explain why no mutual fund manager acknowledges
doing so but claims instead to consider social and environmental issues only in
furtherance of the company’s best interests—in other words, as a box (1) issue. 190 But, as
we have already said, given management’s own incentives to maximize firm value, box
(1) issues do not need shareholder champions.
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If we set the legal question aside, the second issue arises—that is, figuring it all
out. Who, if anyone, is in the right position to determine when an action, taken at the
expense of one company, will nevertheless benefit others and increase the value of the
portfolio as a whole? Getting this wrong—confusing box (3) and box (4)—means
harming the portfolio along with the company. Who is in the best position to sort this
out?
Not mutual funds. To see this, consider a climate change proposal that might be
bad for Exxon but good for other companies. To determine the portfolio-wide effect of
the proposal, the fund would have to calculate: (a) the benefit of the proposal if enacted
(the proposal’s actual effect on climate change); (b) the cost to Exxon of enacting the
proposal (net of the benefit to Exxon); and (c) the weighted marginal impact (whether
benefit or harm) of the action on every other firm in the portfolio. Only a fund capable of
producing and processing all of this information would be in a position to determine
whether a proposal created more benefit than cost throughout the portfolio. 191 But, of
course, this information is entirely unavailable. 192
Another way to see such proposals, in the absence of data about their ultimate
effects, is as tradeoffs between competing values. It is not that pro-growth investors hate
the environment or that pro-social investors are indifferent to growth. Rather, different
investors make this tradeoff in different ways, as they do with respect to diversity, guns,
and other issues on which reasonable people differ. As a result, the relevant information
to decide these issues is not held centrally by fund managers but rather diffused with their
investors.
Thus, given that fund managers have no meaningful advantage in
distinguishing box (3) and box (4), the choice should remain with the individual investor.
None of this is to claim that externalities do not exist. Individual firms often do
take actions that harm other firms or other individuals. In addition to guns and climate,
think of oxycodone or the 737-MAX-8. But we have tools for dealing with such
externalities, including both ex ante regulation and ex post tort liability. These are no
doubt imperfect. But there is no reason to believe that empowering mutual fund
managers to impose costs on portfolio companies in the absence of information and
contrary to the preferences of many of their investors will make the situation any better.
Indeed, there is no reason to suppose such a system would do any good at all. The best
mutual fund intermediaries can do is incorporate a strong shareholder wealth maximand
at the firm level and recognize the limitations of their own knowledge.
Of course, clarifying a problem at the level of theory does not mean that it is
solved. Still, knowing the limits of what mutual fund managers can assume about their
191

Indeed, thinking in this way asks mutual fund stewards to approach issues in much the same way as the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. See Crespi, supra note 180, at 397 (noting that if economywide of business decisions were considered, “deliberations would increasingly come to resemble Federal
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investors advances our understanding of when and how fund managers should vote on
their investors’ behalf. The next Part applies these insights to develop a set of default
preferences for mutual fund voting.

IV.

Optimal Defaults

What do investors want from their mutual fund intermediaries with respect to
voting? The analysis so far suggests two basic propositions. First, mutual funds should
vote on their investors’ behalf when the intermediary possesses a comparative
informational advantage. This advantage may come from the fund’s superior ability to
discover or analyze information, or it may simply come from the fund’s greater incentive
to invest the resources necessary to process available information. Second, mutual fund
intermediaries’ claim to act on investors’ behalf is strongest when they use their voting
authority to hold managers accountable to the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization. Although shareholders certainly have many other motivations, it is likely
impossible for an intermediary to identify among these a stable common interest.
Starting from these basic propositions, this Part surveys the range of issues on
which intermediaries might be asked to vote. It breaks them into four recurring patterns:
contests, environmental and social proposals, governance proposals, and everything else.
Each pattern presents a different situation with respect to the fund’s informational
advantages and its investors’ common interests. Each pattern therefore leads to a
potentially different default approach.
In modeling investor preferences with respect to mutual fund voting, this Part will
be guided by three basic considerations concerning default rules. First, the general
principle of default rule design is to achieve the “majoritarian” or “benefit-of-thebargain” default—that is, the rule that puts the parties in the position they would have
been in had they been able to bargain costlessly over the issue.193 An exception to this
principle arises, however, for rules aimed at forcing parties to share private information—
so called “penalty” or “information-forcing” defaults.194 A third factor to consider is the
“stickiness” of the default—that is, barriers to opting-out of an inefficient rule arising
from factors other than bargaining costs. 195
193

See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 15 (1991) (arguing that “corporate law should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were
the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low”); David Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815
(1991); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116.
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given management’s power to control the voting generally and therefore advocating pro-shareholder
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Ultimately, this Part advances the following framework for allocating voting
authority to mutual fund intermediaries: First, with respect to contests, it argues that
investors would delegate discretionary voting authority to mutual fund intermediaries due
to the funds’ informational advantage and their ability to assume a unified shareholder
purpose. Second, with respect to environmental and social proposals, because there is
neither an information advantage on the part of funds nor a stable common objective
among investors, rational investors would not prefer to delegate discretionary voting
authority to the mutual fund intermediary. Instead, because there is no reason to suppose
that portfolio company managers do not approach environmental and social issues from a
wealth-maximizing perspective, investors would prefer that funds follow management’s
recommendations in voting on these issues. Third, with respect to governance, although
there is a shared interested among investors in favor of wealth maximization, there is
unlikely to be a significant information asymmetry favoring the fund. This is not because
investors are as good as fund advisors in analyzing how corporate governance affects
firm performance but rather because fund advisors are as bad as their investors at
analyzing these questions. Because neither investor nor fund has the requisite
information to vote intelligently on governance proposals, investors’ default preferences
would not favor mutual fund voting. Furthermore, because most governance reforms
conflict with management’s interest, most often by limiting their authority or their tenure,
investors also would not prefer a rule that simply voted governance issues as
recommended by management. The right default approach to governance proposals is
therefore to abstain from voting on them. Again, investors who felt strongly might wish
to have some mechanism for entering a vote on an ad hoc basis. Finally, with respect to
everything else—corporate housekeeping matters and uncontested elections—investors
are likely to prefer that their shares be voted with management. The sections that follow
discuss each of these areas in greater detail.

A. Contests
Contests decide disputes over the future of a company. In a contest there are two
sides: incumbent management versus an insurgent activist or would-be acquiror. The
subject of the dispute is how best to maximize the value of the company. The insurgent
contends that management is destroying value and offers another way forward. 196
Incumbent management answers that its policies are best for the company, often claiming
a long term perspective that the market, judging by the current stock price, does not
default terms). See also Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60
SMU L. REV. 383 (2007) (discussing implications of sticky default rules for corporate law theory); Omri
Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006)
(discussing sticky default rules generally).
196
See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021 (2007) (describing the basic goals and tactics of activist hedge funds).
Activists may not need to actually launch a public intervention in order to successfully influence a
company. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1402-1408
(2007) (distinguishing between situations in which an activist threatens intervention and situations in which
an activist actually intervenes); Vyacheslav Fos & Charles Kahn, The Threat of Intervention, ECGI
Working Paper, Apr. 2019 (modeling disciplinary effect of a threatened activist intervention).
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appreciate or comprehend.197 The contest decides whether there will be an acquisition, a
change in management, or a change in the governance or business of the company. 198
Contests are fought with information. Contestants present evidence supporting
their vision and seek to discredit evidence introduced by the other side. 199 In this, the
dynamic mirrors the adversary system. The contestants are litigants before shareholder
judges with securities law operating as the rules of evidence. 200 The process forces the
disclosure of information and tests its credibility.
Contests are judged according to the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization. Management claims its plans will lead to better shareholder returns than
the insurgents, who make the opposite claim. Would-be acquirors, meanwhile, make the
simplest claim of all: a number. Their bid puts management in the position of having to
defend two theses: first, why their planned future for the company is better, and second,
why the market does not reflect the value of their plan. In both cases, the stock price
crystallizes the goal. The winner of the dispute will be the side that can make the most
persuasive case on how best to maximize shareholder value.
This is not to say that contests are easy to decide. The information presented in
contests is often highly technical. For example, the activist challenge to DowDuPont’s
plans to restructure into three businesses would have required investors to evaluate
whether to divide the combined company and, if so, into how many spinoff entities,
holding which combination of assets to best potentiate growth or acquisition.201
Understanding this information may require some degree of financial sophistication, and
it certainly requires a substantial investment of time and attention.
Are ordinary investors up to the task? Contests solve the production problem
embedded within rational apathy. 202 The adversary dynamic underlying contests assures
197
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discredit the analysis of their opponents. See, e.g., Starboard Value, Transforming Darden Restaurants,
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13D. Section 14.
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See Prashant S. Rao and Chad Bray, DowDuPont Revises Breakup Plan Opposed by Activist Investors,
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that information will be produced to shareholders. But contests alone do not solve the
sophistication or incentive problems.203 Ordinary investors may not be sufficiently
sophisticated to understand the information presented to them in a contest, at least not
without devoting substantial time and attention to it, which they lack the incentive to do.
As a result, even in contest settings, ordinary investors remain afflicted by rational
apathy. They will not vote, or they will be inadequately informed when they do vote.
Moreover, insofar as their failure to participate leads to the wrong choice in the contest,
they will be harmed.
Mutual fund intermediaries possess a comparative information advantage in
deciding contests. Gilson and Gordon articulate this model as a form of specialization:
Activist investors specialize in monitoring portfolio company strategy and
formulating alternatives when appropriate for presentation to the
institutional investors; in turn, institutional investors specialize in …
evaluating proposals presented by activist investors. This specialization is
more efficient than having a single actor play both roles. Each requires a
different business model, and combining them may degrade the
performance of both.204
The model depends upon activist hedge funds or bidders taking on the difficult job of
identifying promising targets—that is, identifying companies which are presently
undervalued and which can be improved. Gilson and Gordon call these funds
“governance entrepreneurs.”205 The governance entrepreneur identifies the target and
presents its analysis to institutional investors, to whom the targeted company makes the
opposite case. All the mutual funds have to do is decide who’s right. 206
The likelihood that the funds will decide correctly depends upon their incentives
and their informational resources. Managers of active funds have both. Increasing the
return on portfolio companies increases AUM—through both portfolio growth and fund
flows—and therefore fees. Given the substantial fees they charge, active funds have
powerful incentives to vote to increase portfolio company value. Moreover, because their
business model depends upon analyzing companies for their portfolio, active funds will
203
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Gilson & Gordon, supra note [6], at 897. Accord Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Anti-Activist Poison
Pills, ___ B.U. L. REV. ___, at 5 (forthcoming 2019) (offering a similar model: “Even if traditional
investment advisors are not well-equipped to perform the tasks of activist hedge funds or to provide
significant, ongoing monitoring of portfolio companies, they have comparative strong incentives to invest
sufficient resources in deciding the outcome when hedge funds and management disagree.”).
205
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 6, at 897.
206
This is not all a fund can do. A fund that suspects underperformance can alert an activist, a tactic known
in the industry as a “RFA” or “request for activist.” David Gelles & Michael J. de la Merced, New
Alliances
in
Battle
for
Corporate
Control,
NY
TIMES
(Mar.
18,
2014),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/new-alliances-in-battle-for-corporate-control/ (quoting activist
Bill Ackman stating that “[p]eriodically, we are approached by large institutions who are disappointed with
the performance of companies they are invested in to see if we would be interested in playing an active role
in effectuating change”). Beyond notification, however, regulatory rules may inhibit closer coordination
among funds. See John Morley, Too Big to be Activist, __ S. Cal. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming) (describing
how Exchange Act Rule 13D and other regulatory rules inhibit coordination among funds).
204

36

have staff and expertise capable of analyzing both sides in the contests brought before
them. The additional burden, in any event, is not great. Scholars count the number of
important contests each year in the dozens. 207
Index funds differ with respect to both incentives and information resources.
First, with regard to incentives, index funds charge a much smaller percentage fee than
active funds: zero or close to it.208 They thus have less to gain directly from
improvements in portfolio company value.209 Moreover, because all index funds are
playing the same game, at least within a relevant sector, they would seem to have little to
gain indirectly by increasing portfolio company performance. 210 However, Kahan and
Rock argue that the direct gains to index funds from improved portfolio company
performance can be large in absolute dollar terms even if they are small as a percentage
of AUM, demonstrating at least for the Big Three, that such gains are likely large enough
to incentivize thoughtful voting in contests. 211
Second, with respect to information resources, index funds would seem to be at a
disadvantage. In contrast to active managers, portfolio selection is not part of an index
fund’s business model.212 As a result, index funds may lack the in-house expertise to
judge between the competing arguments made in contests. But index funds are typically
offered by fund families that also offer actively managed funds. As a result, in voting on
contests, index funds may be able to avail themselves of the investment expertise of
active managers in the same family, an advantage Kahan & Rock refer to as “spillover
knowledge.”213
Finally, it is worth noting that empirical evidence demonstrates that shareholders
value their voting rights principally in connection with contests. Ordinarily, the value of
voting rights are deeply discounted and often not valued at all. 214 However, studies that
207

Rock & Kahan, supra note 22, at 31 (“How many potentially consequential votes are there? It is a little
hard to tell because of settlements before a proxy contest comes to a conclusion but the number is likely a
two-digit figure (and likely in the low two-digits).”)
208
See supra note 22 (noting fee competition among index funds and that fact that at least one fund family,
Fidelity, now charges 0% on index funds).
209
Lund, supra note 12, at PIN.
210
There is some debate on this point. Compare Fisch, et al., supra note 12 (arguing that index funds gain
from improving governance through greater fund flows at the expense of actively managed funds) with
Kahan & Rock, supra note 12 at 25 (answering this argument by noting that designing an index fund’s
governance strategy to profit at the expense of active managers would be self-defeating, given that fund
families house both active and index funds and derive a larger share of their revenue from active funds).
211
Id., at 15 (demonstrating that “Vanguard’s direct financial incentives would be equivalent to those of an
individual shareholder who owns about 1/12 of the number of shares held by Vanguard. For P&G, this
implies that Vanguard’s financial incentives to cast an informed vote are equivalent to the incentives of an
individual shareholder with a staggering $1.06 billion investment.”).
212
Selection of the relevant index, however, is. The design and selection of the index may mirror the task
of selecting a portfolio. See Robertson, supra note XX.
213
Kahan & Rock.
214
Studies valuing voting rights follow various methodologies. Some compare the value of voting and
non-voting shares. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class
Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697 (2008) (finding a 2.3% premium for voting rights in a study of 457 companies
with dual class shares from 1995 to 2003); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and
Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003) (finding a 2% premium for voting rights
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compare the value of voting shares to a synthetic (non-voting) security designed to mimic
the cash flow rights of a common share find that votes may be valued only when they are
contested.215 In other words, voting rights are valuable only when an issue is put into
dispute by the calling of a special meeting, a takeover offer, or an activist attack.216
Otherwise, it seems, voting does not matter to shareholders.
In sum, contests present a situation in which voting authority should be delegated
to the discretion of mutual fund intermediary. The information content of contests is
high, and investors share the common goal of wealth maximization. Most mutual funds
possess an advantage, compared to rationally apathetic investors, in processing this
information, and the common goal makes it possible for them to act on the basis of
investors generally. Therefore, it makes sense to allocate default voting authority in
contests to the mutual fund intermediary. The ability to opt-out on a case-by-case basis
might be preserved for investors who feel strongly to the contrary. Given the dynamics
of rational apathy, however, such investors are likely rare in mutual funds. The burden of
opting out of mutual fund voting in contests should therefore rest with investors.

B. E(nvironmental) and S(ocial)
In contrast to contests, environmental and social (“ES”) issues present voting
situations that involve neither an informational advantage on the part of the mutual fund
intermediary nor the ability to assume a common purpose on the part of all mutual fund
investors.

in a study of 39 companies with dual class shares in 1997); Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of
Corporate Votes?, 110 Q. J. ECON. 1047 (1995) (finding a 9.5% premium for voting rights in a study of 94
companies with dual class shares from 1984 to 1990). Others compare the price of privately negotiated
block sales to the price of publicly traded minority shares. See, e.g., Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales,
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537(2004) (finding a 1% premium on
control block transfers for 46 companies between 1990 and 2000). Still others focus on the equity lending
fee around shareholder record dates (when voting rights are set). Compare Susan E.K. Christoffersen et al.,
Vote Trading and Information Aggregation, 62 J. FIN. 2897 (2007) (using a bank database of equity lending
fees and finding no value attributable to voting rights) with Reena Aggarwal et al, The Role of Institutional
Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market (May 22, 105) (unpublished paper)
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023480) (finding that equity lending fees increase on record dates
when supply is restricted).
215
Avner Kalay, Oğuzhan Karakaş & Shagun Pant, The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and
Evidence from Option Prices, 69 J. FIN. 1235, PIN (2014) (devising the methodology and emphasizing its
advantages in applying to a larger number of stocks and suffering less from selection effects).
216
Id. (finding an average voting premium of 0.16% across the sample but significant increases in the
context of special meetings, hedge fund activism, and merger announcements, which result in 0.15%,
0.09%, and 0.22% increases, respectively). See also Sean J. Griffith & Natalia Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy
Puts and Shareholder Value, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027 (2017) (studying defenses to activism and finding
evidence that shareholders discount the value of their voting rights and, by implication, the cost of any
impingement to their voting rights, unless the voting rights are made salient).
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ES issues typically arise not as contests, 217 but as “shareholder proposals,” a
regulatory creation enabling shareholders to request corporate action on an issue of
interest to them.218 Proposals must generally be precatory in nature—typically phrased as
requests that the company form a committee or issue a report—in order to successfully
run the gauntlet of regulatory requirements and exclusionary challenges. 219 As a result,
even the rare proposal that makes onto the company’s proxy statement and then wins
majority shareholder support need not be implemented. 220 But implementing the
proposal is not the point.221 Raising the issue is.
Shareholder proposals do not provide much information about the issues they
raise. In contrast to the voluminous filings and sharp exchanges that characterize
contests, shareholder proposals are limited to 500 words. 222 Moreover, because
shareholder proposals rarely win majority support, apart from seeking to exclude them
from the proxy, companies exert minimal effort and release minimal information in
countering them.223 Shareholder proposals, in other words, do not provide meaningful
information or decide disputes. They rally the likeminded.
ES proposals reflect a broad array of agendas,224 but shareholder wealth
maximization is often not among them.225 Nevertheless, three kinds of claims may be
advanced to support voting on ES proposals. First, many shareholders may have
preferences other than the maximization of their wealth. Second, ES proposals may
actually increase corporate value. Third, even if ES proposals do not increase corporate
value, they may increase portfolio value. I address each of these in turn.
With respect to the first claim, there is no doubt that ES proposals aimed at an
agenda other than shareholder wealth maximization—whether climate change, gun
control, or board diversity—will reflect the preferences of some shareholders. However,
it is equally certain that such proposals do not reflect the preferences of all shareholders.
217

This is true by definition. Contests are defined above as disputes involving a takeover bid or a board
challenge. Any governance (or environmental/ social) issue arising as a relevant part of that challenge was
treated as part of the contest. Such issues arising outside of that context are, by definition, distinct.
218
See SEC Rule 14a-8.
219
A shareholder proposal that required board action would likely run afoul of SEC rules allowing
companies to exclude proposals that are “improper under state law.” Rule 14a-8(i)(1). However, because
shareholders typically do have the authority directly to amend corporate bylaws, shareholder proposed
bylaw amendments need not be structured as precatory proposals. See, e.g., DCGL 109.
220
Because corporate action can only be taken by the board, a successful proposal only prompts the board
to consider whether it ought to implement the requested action. See DGCL 141(a).
221
Bainbridge, supra note 122, at PIN.
222
14a-8. In contests, by contrast, both sides aggressively court shareholder support in presentations and
analyst calls, and management discloses information to counter the claims of activists. See supra note 199
(providing examples from Darden and Buffalo Wild Wings contests)
223
For example, in its 2019 proxy statement, Exxon offered 500 word replies to each of two climate-related
proposals, recommending that shareholders vote against each. See Exxon Mobil, Notice of 2019 Annual
Meeting and Proxy Statement, at 63-65 (Apr. 11, 2019).
224
For example, in the 2018 proxy season featured proposals relating to issues ranging from environmental
concerns, diversity, discrimination, human rights, animal rights, gun violence, and “fake news.” See
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 2018 Proxy Season Review, July 12, 2018, at 7-10.
225
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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As a result, when mutual funds vote on ES proposals, they necessarily act contrary to the
interests of at least some of their investors.226 It is a strained interpretation of fiduciary
duty that would allow a mutual fund intermediary to sacrifice the college or retirement
savings of one investor in favor of a social policy favored by another.
To the extent that ES proposals may reflect actual investor preferences, the
comparative informational advantage belongs to individual shareholders, each of whom
knows what her preferences are, not to institutional investors. Institutions may organize
shareholders by their ES preferences ex ante—for example, by selling them “socially
responsible” funds that fully disclose the agendas they may pursue in the place of wealth
maximization.227 Alternatively, they may poll them ex post, as ES issues arise, by
implementing a form of pass-through voting. 228 In the absence of either, however, it
seems clear that an intermediary fails to act according to the best interests of its investors
by pursuing some objective other than shareholder wealth maximization. Moreover,
pursuing such interests introduces conflicts and accountability problems. 229 The more
“other interests” a mutual fund manager can cite to justify their conduct, the more she can
serve her own.230
Second, it may also be the case that an ES proposal, if adopted, would increase
shareholder wealth. In theory, ES proposals might increase or destroy shareholder
wealth. The question is who is in the best position to know which is which: will a given
proposal create wealth or destroy it? The obvious answer is management. Managers
have access to private, company-specific information to determine the likely effect of any
initiative on shareholder value. Shareholder proponents and institutional investors do
not. As a result, in the absence of conflict, management is in the best position to decide
whether the proposal is in the corporation’s best interest. Although there are obvious
conflicts involved in contests (where managers’ jobs are on the line) and potential
conflicts involved in governance reforms (insofar as these have the effect of limiting
managers’ authority or shortening their tenure), there is no apparent conflict involved in
deciding whether an ES proposal is value maximizing or not. Management has as strong
an incentive to increase corporate value through ES as through any other initiative.
Given the adequacy of its incentives and the superiority of its information, management
would seem to be in a better position than any shareholder, individual or institutional, to
decide whether an ES proposal will increase or destroy shareholder value.
226

Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 219 (2018) (“Because funds vote ‘allor-nothing’ for, against or abstain, even where funds vote the way a majority of their investors are likely to
prefer, there will be a divergence from the preferences of a minority of their investors.”).
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There are plenty of problems with these funds as well. See, e.g., Brakman-Reiser & Tucker, supra.
228
On complications introduced by pass through voting, see supra notes 52-58. It is worth noting here that
rational apathy may exert less of a role in ES voting, given findings that investors are more likely to vote
actively when they have heterogeneous preferences. See Dragana Cvijanović, Moqi Groen-Xu &
Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Free-Riders and Underdogs: Participation in Corporate Voting (Sept. 29,
2017) (unpublished paper) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939744).
229
Consider, for example, the gun policy proposals discussed above. Although it is possible to conceive of
many ways in which advisory firms serve their own interests through such initiatives, it is harder to see
how they serve their investors. See supra notes 170-177 and accompanying text.
230
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 193 (“[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the
equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”).
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Third is the claim that broadly diversified mutual funds have a special advantage
in assessing the portfolio-wide effects of ES proposals that, although they may reduce
value at an individual firm, enhance the value of the portfolio as a whole. As discussed
above, this claim attributes far too much knowledge on the part of the mutual
intermediary, assuming that the fund can calculate the effect of the proposal every firm
within the portfolio and then offset these effects according to the weight of each firm
within the portfolio in order to determine the overall effect. Each fund family would
have to do this for each of its funds individually, since their portfolios differ, without
access to private, company-specific information with respect to any of the firms in any of
their portfolios. This is clearly too much to ask of an index fund. A better approach to
social externalities lies in regulation or in the civil or criminal justice system.
It is also notable that funds do not in fact claim to treat ES issues as externalities
to be balanced on a portfolio-wide basis. Even BlackRock which, among the Big Three,
is perhaps best known for advancing an outspoken position on social issues, 231 clearly
states in its stewardship policy that its approach to ES issues is “to protect and enhance
[our clients’] economic interest in the companies in which we invest on their behalf.” 232
BlackRock thus conceives the voting decision as “economic,” not value-driven or
ethical,233and emphasizes the company perspective, not the portfolio perspective.234 State
Street and Vanguard adopt the same fundamental perspective. 235 Moreover, it is worth
noting that the stewardship guidelines of all three emphasize case-by-case voting on ES
issues, contradicting any claim that by investing with one or the other fund family,
investors are effectively opting in to a specific level of engagement on ES issues. None
of the Big Three claims to put any other value ahead of wealth maximization in its
approach to ES issues.
In conclusion, a rational investor would prefer mutual funds to follow
management’s recommendations in voting on ES issues. Management has superior
information in determining the effect of ES proposals on shareholder wealth.
Furthermore, outside of the context of special “socially responsible” funds and in the
absence of pass-through voting mechanisms, shareholder wealth maximization is the only
investor purpose that mutual funds can validly assume. Because management has
adequate incentives to use its information advantage to advance this purpose, mutual
funds should defer to management in voting on ES proposals.
This conclusion might seem to limit mutual fund authority, but it is likely that
many if not all fund families would happily forego the burden of voting on ES proposals.
Voting on ES issues makes funds a target for lobbying from cause investors and political
231

See supra note XX and accompanying text [guns].
BlackRock Guidelines, at 12.
233
Id., at 13 (“We do not see it as our role to make social, ethical, or political judgments on behalf of
clients, but rather, to protect their long-term economic interests as shareholders.”).
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Id., at 12.
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See, e.g., State Street Guidelines, at 8 (“When voting [on ES proposals], we fundamentally consider
whether the adoption of [the] proposal … would promote long-term shareholder value in the context of the
company’s existing practices and disclosures as well as existing market practice.”); Vanguard Guidelines,
at 10 (emphasizing case-by-case approach to ES voting to aimed at long-term corporate value).
232
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interest groups, and failing to vote the “correct” way on a social issue may put the
industry at risk politically or economically. 236 Funds might therefore prefer to avoid ES
voting altogether, but being the first to do so might render a fund family vulnerable to
punishment from interest groups threatening to shift assets to competitors who, perhaps
cynically, remain “engaged” on such issues. Funds might therefore prefer an industrywide rule imposing deference to management on ES issues. Furthermore, moving away
from ES voting would reduce the cost of stewardship to smaller funds, lowering the
barrier to entry, thereby improving the competitiveness of the industry. 237

C. G(overannce)
“Governance” is the set of rules, policies, and procedures that determine how a
firm is run.238 Governance issues occupy an interesting middle position with respect to
contests, on the one hand, and ES proposals, on the other. Like contests (and unlike ES
issues), mutual fund intermediaries can evaluate governance issues from the common
investor interest in wealth maximization. Also similar to contests (and dissimilar to ES),
management is not disinterested in deciding on governance issues since most governance
reforms would either limit managerial authority or shorten management’s tenure.
However, like ES issues (and unlike contests), governance issues arise through
shareholder proposals and contain little meaningful information content. As a result, this
Part argues that mutual funds should generally abstain from voting on governance
proposals relating to portfolio companies, unless specifically instructed to do so.
Governance proposals typically seek to amend corporate bylaws or implore
boards to amend the charter to add or eliminate a particular term, such as a staggered
board or dual-class shares.239 Governance terms are proposed in order to increase
shareholder wealth, and offending terms are targeted because they allegedly reduce
236

See, e.g., Chris Morris, Parkland Survivor Wants Investors to Boycott BlackRock and Vanguard,
FORTUNE, Apr. 18 (2018) (reporting on David Hogg’s lobbying for a boycott of BlackRock and Vanguard
funds as a result of their holdings of gun companies).
237
See supra text accompanying note 115.
238
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (2012)
(“Corporate governance, broadly defined, consists of the institutional structures, legal rules, and best
practices that determine which body within the corporation is empowered to make particular decisions, how
the members of that body are chosen, and the norms that should guide decision making.”); MARGRET M.
BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 3 (defining corporate governance as “the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control
is exercised, and how the risks and return from the activities they undertake are allocated”).
239
For example, the Illinois State Board of Investment offered the following precatory proposal to Quest
Diagnostics:
RESOLVED, that shareholders of Quest Diagnostics Incorporated urge the Board of
Directors to take all necessary steps (other than any steps that must be taken by
shareholders) to eliminate the classification of the Board of Directors and to require that
all directors elected at or after the annual meeting held in 2013 be elected on an annual
basis.
See Quest Diagnostics Inc., Definitive 14A Proxy Statement at 59–60 (Apr. 2, 2012).

42

shareholder wealth.240 Mutual fund intermediaries are therefore not constrained by the
principle of wealth maximization in acting on behalf of their investors with respect to
governance proposals. Furthermore, governance proposals, unlike ES proposals, are
often effective at achieving their ultimate ends. For example, many corporations
destaggered their boards following the passage of precatory proposals urging them to do
so.241 And many others agreed to destagger after being approached with the threat of a
shareholder proposal.242
With respect to the quality of information presented, however, governance
proposals are much closer to ES proposals than they are to contests. Governance
proposals are subject to the same 500 word limit as other proposals. 243 As a result, and in
marked contrast to the wealth of firm-specific information marshaled by both sides to a
contest, governance proposals typically describe the provision under consideration in
general terms without seeking to apply it to the specific situation of the company at
which it is being proposed.244 Governance proposals, in other words, are “issue-specific”
rather than “firm-specific.”245
Unfortunately, although issue-specific information may supply some insight into
the general effect of a given governance provision, it cannot assist mutual funds (or
anyone else) in deciding how to vote on a particular governance proposal at a specific
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The Illinois State Board of Investment, for example, emphasizes that destaggering “could … contribute
to improving performance and increasing firm value.” See Quest Diagnostics Inc., Definitive 14A Proxy
Statement at 60 (Apr. 2, 2012).
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See, e.g., Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 149 (2008)
(analyzing data from 2004–2005 and finding that precatory resolutions increase the likelihood of
destaggering); Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium:
Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368 (2007) (studying the
2002–2004 proxy season and finding increasing willingness to remove important anti-takeover defenses,
such as the classified board and poison pill, in response to shareholders’ requests).
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See 121 Companies Agreed to Move towards Annual Elections, HARV. L. SCH. S’HOLDER RIGHTS
PROJECT, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml (last visited Jan. 27,
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See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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For example, the Illinois State Board of Investment’s proposal to destagger the Quest Diagnostics board
included a general statement that “[h]aving directors stand for elections annually makes directors more
accountable to shareholders,” a review of data suggesting that large companies have increasingly been
destaggering boards, a citation to “empirical studies reporting that classified boards could be associated
with lower firm valuation and/or worse corporate decision-making,” and an exhortation to vote in favor of
the proposal. Id. at 60.
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Kahan & Rock, supra note 22, at 33–34. In their words:
[C]orporate governance arrangements . . . may turn largely on issue-specific information
(such as whether cumulative voting is generally desirable) or on company-specific
information that is either not the focus of stockpickers (such as how incentive
compensation should be designed or whether a director nominee is independent and
regularly attends meetings) or that is easily observable (such as company size, industry,
and stock price performance) – rather than on, or in addition to, company-specific
information that traders are concerned about (such as cash flow projections and
managerial quality).
Id. at 35.
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firm. There are no “one-size fits all” governance solutions.246 Instead, optimal
governance arrangements are endogenous to firms.247 The general effect of a provision is
of little use in understanding how it will affect value at a particular firm.
Moreover, not only is issue-specific knowledge general and therefore unhelpful, it
is also frequently wrong. Recent empirical scholarship demonstrates that many widely
held views concerning the effects of corporate governance are wrong or, at least,
overstated. Consider the example of staggered boards. Bedrock corporate law theory
supports the proposition that staggered boards increase agency costs and harm
shareholders by insulating managers from the market for corporate control. 248
Demonstrating the impact of this theory on actual companies, however, has been a
challenge. Although prominent studies find that staggered boards have a negative effect
on corporate value,249 other studies challenge this conclusion, using alternative statistical
techniques to show that staggered boards may in fact increase value for some firms.250
Studies also suggest that enacting shareholder proposals to destagger boards may destroy
shareholder value.251 Scholarly dispute remains, but it seems fair to say that the
company-specific effect of staggered boards is unproven and now hotly contested. 252
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Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, Peril, supra note 158, at 1862 (“[T]he research we have analyzed on the
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(unpublished
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As with staggered boards, so too with many other corporate governance
provisions. For example, scholars often criticize dual class share structures for insulating
managers and permitting the expropriation of shareholder wealth. 253 Accordingly, the
Big Three along with other institutional investors have pushed to impose a ban on dual
class structures.254 Yet empirical studies have generally failed to demonstrate a negative
share price effect from dual class shares.255 Empirical studies have also failed to prove a
link between board independence and share price.256 Many studies find no negative
wealth effect from poison pill adoptions,257 and at least one study found a significant
increase in share value attributable to poison pills.258 Furthermore, the price effect of
various indices of good corporate governance, once documented in the literature, 259 has
Activism: Why Run Away from the Evidence? (June 23, 2017) (unpublished paper) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2991854) (responding to the response). See also Miroslava Straska & H. Gregory
Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, 49 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 933, 950 (2014) (broadly surveying the literature on the effects of anti-takeover
provisions affect on shareholders and concluding that in spite of a large volume of studies, “the net effects
of these provisions on shareholder wealth remain uncertain”).
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since disappeared.260 More anecdotally, it is worth recalling that Enron had exemplary
corporate governance.261
These results are too common and too consistent to be attributable to
measurement error.262 Instead, Goshen and Squire contend that such results demonstrate
an inevitable tradeoff between empowering versus constraining managers, what they call
“principal costs.”263 In this conception, the role of corporate governance is to mediate the
right balance of authority and accountability on a firm-by-firm basis. 264 The appropriate
balance is resolutely company-specific. Mere familiarity with the general issues
presented is unhelpful and often misleading as applied to a particular case.
The governance staff and stewardship groups that advise mutual funds on voting
can be excused for not thinking of governance proposals in this way. They are nonacademics, and as such, are likely often unaware of the extent to which various
governance provisions are contested in the literature. Moreover, they are faced with a
monumental task—voting on hundreds of thousands of proposals at tens of thousands of
companies each year.265 Much more than papers offering subtle analyses and
sophisticated statistical models, these professionals need a simple set of heuristics to keep
their task from becoming overwhelming. These heuristics are reflected in their voting
guidelines, in which each of the Big Three states that it will generally vote against
staggered boards, poison pills, and dual class shares, all without taking into account
260
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characteristics suggesting that a firm may benefit from such provisions. 266 This reduces
to an unnuanced, one-size-fits all approach to governance. While such an approach
might make sense for the agents that make up stewardship groups, it makes no sense for
the ultimate beneficial owners that invest in mutual funds. An approach to stewardship
that destroys portfolio company value is no way to maximize shareholder wealth.
The foregoing analysis implies that index funds should not vote on governance
proposals any more than they should vote on environmental and social proposals. A
better way for index funds to play a role in governance would be for funds to design
governance-focused indexes, much as they do for their social responsibility funds. 267 So
a fund complex could create, for example, the S&P 500 Unstaggered Board Index or the
Russell 2000 One-Share-One-Vote Index. Although investors might seem less interested
in the obscure workings of corporate governance than in pressing social and
environmental issues, they will likely play close attention if good-governance indexes
outperform ordinary indexes. The message of the empirical literature, of course, is that
we should not hold our breath for this to occur. But if that really is the message, then
index funds should not be voting on governance.
Perhaps this argument disregards “spillover knowledge” – that is, the possibility
that active managers will share sufficient company-specific information with index funds
in the same fund family to make them competent stewards of corporate governance. 268
Spillover knowledge may work in contests, but there the necessary information to decide
the contest was produced and rigorously challenged by each of the two sides to the
dispute.269 Governance proposals, by contrast, are 500 words long and contain no
company-specific information. Still, maybe active funds have adequate companyspecific information to vote intelligently on governance and can pass this knowledge to
index funds in the same family. On closer inspection, however, this is not so.
Voting intelligently requires an investment in acquiring and analyzing
information. Whether a vote on a particular issue is worth the investment depends upon
the cost of the investment relative to the expected return. With regard to contests, at
least, these returns can be large: acquirors offer significant premiums and activists
promise steep gains from the adoption of their plans. Moreover, in contests, information
is pushed to voters.
Both sides develop evidence for their position (and
counterarguments to the position of their opponents) and submit it all to voters, thereby
reducing the voters’ cost of information. As a result, in contests, the voter’s expected
return from information is high and the cost of the investment in it is low.
Governance votes present the opposite situation: low expected returns and high
information costs. As discussed above, the empirical literature implies that expected
returns from governance reform are low, often zero, and sometimes negative. 270
Furthermore, the cost of acquiring and analyzing information to vote intelligently is
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higher for governance reforms than it is for contests. The information produced in
connection with governance proposals is minimal, general, and unchecked by the
adversarial process. As a result, the voter must pull the necessary information from her
own research and analysis. This is likely to be a laborious exercise, prone to error, and
considering the uncertain value of the governance reform, likely not worth the effort.
Given the low expected return and the high information costs, active funds are not much
more likely than index funds to vote intelligently on governance reforms.
Finally, there is a more profound challenge to spillover governance knowledge.
The essential difference between active funds and indexes is that active funds are
selective while broad-based indexes own essentially everything. Many take the lesson of
modern portfolio theory to be that the performance of active funds do not beat indexes
because active returns, on the whole, regress to a mean that is essentially the same as the
index return and, once fees are taken into account, worse. 271 But this assumes that the
index return and the average return of active funds are related. They are not. Active
managers are not trying to replicate the index. They are trying to pick winners.
Winners exist, but active managers often fail to pick them. 272 This is why actively
managed funds generally underperform, not equal, broad-based index returns.273 The
index includes all the winners the active managers missed. Again, selectivity is the
cause. Recent research suggests that index returns overall are driven by a small subset of
companies that outperform their peers. 274 Because indexes hold everything, the
outperformers are in the index. But because active managers are selective, they may or
may not hold the outperformers. If active managers overweight the outperformers, they
beat the index. If they do not, they underperform the index. That active managers
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underperform the index on average means that active managers are wrong most of the
time about which stocks to overweight. 275
The fact that active managers are mostly wrong about which stocks to pick has
profound consequences for the knowledge that we can attribute to fund intermediaries,
active or passive. Basically, not much. If active managers are typically wrong about the
basic corporate attributes driving performance—the analysis of which is an essential
premise of their business model—it seems foolish to expect them accurately to analyze
the subtleties of how a particular governance package will affect corporate performance.
The situation is analogous to the distinction between gross motor skills and fine motor
skills. Children ordinarily must show that they can roll over and crawl before being
asked to play Liszt. Active managers’ returns suggest that close analyses of how
governance terms affect corporate performance are well beyond their developmental
stage. And if active funds cannot do it, index funds, with far weaker incentives and far
smaller information resources, certainly cannot.
What then to do about mutual fund voting on corporate governance? Although
they can assume a common wealth-maximizing purpose for their investors, mutual funds
do not have adequate information to act as stewards of governance. At the same time,
mutual funds cannot simply defer to management on governance because management
will often be conflicted in evaluating governance reforms. Unlike ES proposals or
ordinary business decisions, governance reforms threaten to restrict managerial authority
or shorten managers’ tenure. In light of this conflict, investors would not want their
funds to simply defer to management. A better outcome, therefore, would be for mutual
funds to abstain from voting on governance—that is not to vote at all. These abstentions
would be tallied as present but not cast, as in the case of “broker non-votes.” 276 If the
corporation determined success as the percentage of votes cast, the absence of mutual
fund votes would have no effect on the result, having been effectively removed from both
the numerator and denominator.277 An alternative way of producing abstention is through
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“mirror voting,” in which mutual funds cast their votes on an issue in a proportion
mirroring the votes cast by retail investors.278 Because it produces the same outcome as
abstention without complicating portfolio companies’ processes for counting votes,
mirror voting may be a simpler means to the same end. However it is achieved, the
principle of abstention recognizes that mutual funds lack the information to decide
governance issues and, due to structural conflicts, cannot simply defer to management.
As with delegation to management in the context of ES proposals, mutual fund
abstention from voting on governance should be treated as a default rule. Mechanisms
ought to be made available for individual shareholders to notify mutual funds of their
preferences on governance votes as they arise. In the (probably rare) event that funds
receive such instructions from their investors, they should be permitted to vote a
proportional number of shares accordingly. Similarly, in the (perhaps more likely) event
that a mutual fund arrives at a particular view concerning the corporate governance
structure of a specific company in the portfolio, the fund ought to be able to express its
view to investors and solicit their consent to vote in a particular manner. In either case,
abstention remains the default such that a fund seeking to vote bears the burden of
soliciting consent from its investors.
This default rule structure operates as a rebuttable presumption in favor of
abstention, reflecting the information problems afflicting both mutual funds and their
investors with respect to governance. The burden on rebuttal—that is, the burden of
shifting the default—rests upon the party seeking to vote. If the investor wishes to vote,
she must notify the fund, and if the fund wishes to vote, it must receive the consent of its
investor. It is likely, as a result, that voting on governance proposals will be rare from
either investors or funds, an outcome that will save stewardship costs without doing
violence to portfolio companies or their governance arrangements.
An alternative, noted above, would be to offer more active stewardship funds to
investors. In addition to the current array of low or no-cost index funds, mutual fund
providers might offer higher-fee “Stewardship Funds” with substantially greater
investments in stewardship, allowing them to more rigorously analyze governance issues
and perhaps even make governance proposals of their own.279 Investors would thus have
the opportunity to opt-in to a robust form of stewardship in the place of the minimal form
outlined here. But one might well ask why private ordering has not produced such
alternatives already. It is not because there is anything stopping fund families from
offering high-fee, high-stewardship funds. Stewardship Funds could be offered today,
and if they outperformed no-frills index funds, they would no doubt find a market.
Rather, the reason that we do not see competition between high-stewardship and lowmajority of the votes cast in favor of or against such action… by the holders of shares entitled to vote
thereon”). As a result, or New York corporations, neither abstentions nor non-votes count as votes against.
278
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stewardship funds is the regulatory expectation that funds vote on all matters at all times.
By imposing these expectations on all funds, regulators inhibit the development of lowcost voting infrastructures like the one I have outlined here, thereby taxing all funds with
the cost of super-optimal stewardship. 280
These arguments are taken up in greater detail in Part V below. Before getting to
them, however, it is necessary to address the odds and ends of shareholder voting.

D. Everything Else
The rest of the matters on which shareholders are regularly asked to vote consist
largely of management proposals, uncontested elections, and “say-on-pay” advisory
votes.281 The stakes are lower in these votes because there is no real alternative
presented. The choice is simply yes, no, or abstain. Although each context raises slightly
different issues, mutual funds should generally vote in favor of each, but should retain the
ability to cast protest votes in board elections and in say-on-pay votes for those
companies that severely underperform.
First, with regard to management proposals, mutual funds should vote in favor of
management proposals that do not expand management’s authority vis-à-vis shareholders
or otherwise shrink managerial accountability to shareholders. Such proposals often
relate to uncontroversial housekeeping items, such as the appointment of independent
auditors, or other ordinary business matters for which shareholder approval may be
necessary, such as a large issuance of equity securities. 282 Given that unconflicted
management has strong incentives to propose only those projects that will increase
shareholder value, mutual funds should generally vote in favor of management proposals.
However, proposals that do raise conflicts between shareholders and managers—such as
280
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those that empower managers at the expense of shareholders or that reduce managerial
accountability to shareholders—raise the same governance concerns addressed above and
should therefore be treated in the same way at the ballot box.283 Mutual funds cannot
defer to conflicted management nor can they decide the matter themselves due to the lack
of information. They should therefore abstain.
Second, with regard to uncontested elections, mutual funds are again presented
with a binary choice: vote for or against the nominee. In the absence of a contest, there is
no alternative candidate, nor is there an adversarial process to develop information
necessary to evaluate the nominee.284 The mutual fund learns only what management
discloses. However, given intra-firm incentives to maximize shareholder value, there is
no a priori basis to suspect that the company would nominate incompetent directors and,
unless the company significantly underperforms its peers, no reason to suppose they have
done so. Therefore, in the absence of a contest, mutual funds should generally vote for
the board’s nominees. An exception to this rule, however, is the casting of protest votes,
discussed in greater detail below.
Say-on-pay votes are similar to uncontested elections in that they present a binary
choice—approve or disapprove—with no real alternative. Again, the company provides
the information required by regulators as well as any additional information management
might wish to disclose. The most relevant information appears in the “Compensation
Disclosure and Analysis” section of the proxy, 285 and in particular, in the tabular
disclosure of compensation and benefits.286 While this may not be enough information
for mutual funds to evaluate the finer points of management’s compensation package, its
principal value lies in facilitating comparisons with other firms. How were managers at
this company compensated relative to their peers? How were managers compensated
relative to similarly-situated companies that performed well versus similarly-situated
companies that performed poorly? These comparisons provide a further opportunity to
cast protest votes.
Protest votes on say-on-pay and director elections provide an opportunity for
long-only investors, especially index funds, to discipline management. Even if the board
is ultimately re-elected and management’s compensation is ultimately approved,
receiving a high number of protest votes signals discontent in the investor base. Investor
discontent may negatively impact the reputations of individual directors and managers. It
may also signal that a company is ripe for activism or takeover. Boards and managers are
therefore eager to avoid protest votes. Long term investors’ ability to cast a protest vote
thus serves to render managers more accountable to their interests.
Mutual funds have an advantage over ordinary investors in determining whether
to cast a protest vote. It is not that the relevant information is hard to find. The essential
facts concerning compensation and corporate performance are publicly available. It is
283
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rather that ordinary investors lack the time and attention necessary to make the relevant
comparisons, especially when they must do so for the hundreds or thousands of firms in a
broadly diversified index. Mutual funds, by contrast, can make meaningful use of this
information and even automate comparisons between firms and groups of firms.
Spillover knowledge, shared between the active and passively managed funds in a family,
may also facilitate these comparisons.287 Indeed, some mutual funds design their say-onpay voting in precisely this way. For example, Vanguard articulates a set of red and
yellow flags to guide its voting on compensation, including evaluations of pay relative to
the performance of peer firms.288 In this way, votes on compensation packages may be
used to punish underperforming companies. 289 Likewise, withholding votes from an
incumbent board of directors can be used as a protest vote against companies that
significantly underperform their peers.
Mutual funds should reserve protest votes to punish underperformance, not to
push companies on environmental, social, or other issues. Again, this is not because
investors do not care about environmental or social issues. 290 Some certainly do, while
others differ. However, unless investors have opted into an investment vehicle, such as a
social responsibility fund, that expressly puts these concerns on the same level as
performance, the most that mutual fund managers can assume of their investors is that
they prefer high returns to low ones. Furthermore, in the context of uncontested elections
and say-on-pay, mutual funds do not have the information to perform subtle, multi-factor
analyses. The best they can do is bluntly compare the returns of peer firms. Because of
the necessarily rough nature of these comparisons, protest votes should be cast only
against the worst performers—perhaps the bottom decile or firms that are repeatedly in
the lowest quartile. It would do no good for such a firm to defend its underperformance
on the basis of is pro-social policies, which ought to be treated as wholly irrelevant by all
funds except those specifically organized to promote that goal. Protest votes, in sum,
should track underperformance alone and even then should be relatively rare.
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V.

Resetting the Default Rule

This Article has argued that a rational investor would prefer that mutual funds
vote on her behalf in contests but not in ESG proposals. Yet this default voting
arrangement does not in fact occur. Instead, mutual funds typically take the authority to
vote for their investors on all matters. And, having taken this authority, they exercise it.
If this is not what a rational investor would want, why do mutual funds take and exercise
voting rights contrary to investors’ preferences?
Path-dependency is part of the answer. For most of their history, mutual funds
took broad voting authority in order to save administrative costs, which they then
minimized still further by not bothering to vote.291 Rational apathy likely prevented
investors from insisting on a different arrangement. For the same reasons that individual
shareholders are unlikely to vote, they are unlikely to demand the right to vote when they
invest in mutual funds. The dynamics of rational apathy thus make voting allocations
“sticky” when not assigned by default to the ultimate beneficial owner. 292
But path-dependency and rational apathy cannot explain why mutual funds
exercise voting authority. If anything, they suggest that mutual funds would take the
right to vote but generally not exercise it. Instead, mutual funds now vote regularly in all
electoral matters. These voting patterns are explained by regulation.
Law and regulation push mutual funds to vote.293 Although the SEC has
suggested that funds and their investors can delegate voting rights in any way they
choose,294 fund managers likely feel compelled by fiduciary duty to vote.295 This is
surely an incorrect interpretation of fiduciary duty. A fund fiduciary does not advance its
investors’ interests by voting when they would prefer that it not. Nor do funds waste
shareholder value by not casting votes.296 Yet the DOL clings to this interpretation,297
and the SEC equivocates.298 Both agencies should unambiguously renounce the view
that fiduciary duty requires funds to vote in all electoral matters. 299
A better interpretation of a fund intermediary’s fiduciary duty is the framework
articulated by this article. Fund managers should vote only to maximize shareholder
wealth and only when they have an information advantage in doing so. As I have argued
above, this implies that mutual funds should have discretionary voting authority over
contests, but not over other matters. Both the SEC and the DOL should adopt this
perspective on fiduciary duty.
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But announcing a new approach to fiduciary duty may not be enough. Because
mutual fund voting is a paradigmatic sticky default, investors are unlikely to ask to
change the prevailing arrangement. Moreover, those that do ask may meet with
resistance from mutual fund families that have found ways to use the current rules to
benefit themselves—for example, by deploying them as a barrier to entry or as a means
of marketing themselves to various constituencies.300 Because the default allocation is
sticky and because funds may not relinquish their authority easily, regulators need to do
more than clarify fiduciary duty. The need to reset the default rules of mutual fund
voting.
Mutual funds should have discretionary voting authority over contests only. 301 In
ES proposals, mutual funds votes should default to management’s recommendation. In
governance proposals, mutual fund votes should default to abstentions, either through
mirror-voting or by a mechanism analogous to broker non-votes. Setting the default rules
in this way would allow the market to determine the value of stewardship. Fund families
could alter the default rules ex ante by organizing “Stewardship Funds” to compete
against minimally voting index funds. If stewardship has value, such funds will attract
investors. Such competition is impossible at present, however, given the baseline voting
infrastructure currently demanded by regulators.
Furthermore, resetting the default rule for intermediary voting as described in this
article creates incentives for funds to develop technologies to facilitate pass-through
voting. If voting on ESG is valuable to investors, funds will invest in pass-through
voting systems so that their investors can express their preferences on these issues. If
not, they will not, but in this case nothing of any value is lost. In contrast, the stickiness
of the current arrangement along with the temptation of funds to serve their own interests
through voting creates far weaker incentives to develop innovative voting solutions.
Eliminating funds’ default voting rights over ESG will encourage funds to develop an
efficient system for soliciting and complying with investor voting preferences.
Realigning the default delegation of voting authority with investor preferences
promises to address many of the problems arising from mutual fund voting, but it does
not solve them all. As long as mutual funds retain the authority to vote on behalf of their
investors—as, for example, in contests—the potential for conflict remains. Regulators
should therefore consider two additional rule changes to address Corporate Client
Conflict and Uniform Policy Conflict. 302
First, with respect to Corporate Client Conflict, the SEC should require disclosure
of all situations in which a mutual fund provides 401(k) or other advisory business to a
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portfolio company and bar funds from voting in situations of substantial conflict. Funds
should not be barred from seeking advisory business from a portfolio company. Such a
rule would erect a mutual fund version of Glass-Steagall, artificially separating index
funds from the rest of the advisory business. Nevertheless, because such business
relationships may lead funds to vote contrary to investor interests in contested elections,
funds should be barred from voting on investors’ behalf when conflicts are severe. In
such cases, conflicted funds should be made to abstain, eliminating their votes from both
the numerator and the denominator, through mirror voting or some other method. In
order to monitor compliance with this principle, funds should also be required to track
potential conflicts and disclose them to the SEC. 303
Second, to address Uniform Policy Conflict, the SEC should mandate the
devolution of voting authority to the fund level. As described above, centralization of
voting at the family level often means disregarding investor interests at the fund level.
Although the scope of the problem is smaller if mutual funds are given discretionary
voting authority only for contests, it does not disappear entirely. 304 Fortunately, there is a
simple fix: decentralization.305 Different funds within a family would be required to
register their votes independently according to fund objectives, which would be stated in
advance and clearly advertised to investors. Under this regime, a value fund could vote
in favor of risky mergers and shareholder activism that would allow those companies to
unlock value. At the same time, an income or capital appreciation fund in the same
complex could support management teams that promise steady dividends, and vote
against risky projects proposed by activists or prospective acquirers that threaten to
compromise that goal. There is some evidence that mutual fund families are beginning to
move in this direction.306 Pushing them further in this direction would ensure that a fund
investor’s vote is cast according to her interests, not according to the interests of investors
in other funds or according to the interests of the fund complex itself.
This is an opportune time for regulators to act to address the problems created by
mutual fund ownership. Moreover, mutual funds should welcome the change. The
reforms articulated here will not only allow funds to economize on the infrastructure of
proxy voting, they will also help the industry allay some of the larger concerns recently
raised about ownership incentives and the concentration of too much economic and
political power in too few hands. Returning to the fundamental question of whether and
when rational investors would prefer to delegate discretionary voting authority to mutual
fund intermediaries implies voting structures to allay many of these concerns.

VI.

Conclusion
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This article has articulated a theory of mutual fund voting and used it to frame a
system of default rules for frequently recurring issues. Funds should exercise discretion
in voting on investors’ behalf in contests. They vote with management on environmental
and social proposals, and they should abstain from voting on governance proposals. This
article has further argued that regulators should reset the default allocation of voting
authority between mutual funds and their investors accordingly.
Among academics, I suspect, the most controversial argument advanced by this
article is the claim that mutual funds should stop voting on governance issues. But the
connection between governance and performance remains elusive. Corporate governance
scholars have consistently failed to demonstrate a price impact of specific governance
terms, and stock-pickers have consistently failed to beat indexes. If governance scholars
could get rich by shorting companies with staggered boards and going long on companies
that destaggered, they could retire and never attend another faculty meeting. Alas, we
cannot. Neither can mutual fund managers, active or passive. Hence, this article is an
admonishment to eat our own cooking. We should not expect mutual fund intermediaries
to put into practice research hypotheses that we cannot prove.
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